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1Introduction
Economists depend on data to find patterns and to test their theories. This data
often takes the form of official statistics, such as national accounts. With the
rise of cheap computer storage, faster computers and better algorithms, it has
become feasible to analyze larger and less structured datasets. Insights gained
from parsing text corpuses or scraping websites allow to measure concepts that
are not found in the traditional data sources. Combining these new indicators
with existing data and methods has proven particularly fruitful.
This thesis contains three essays in empirical economics, which leverage the
novel abundance of electronic unstructured data. I address two – quite distinct
– topics in this dissertation. First, I explore the effect of automation on labor
markets. Second, I study financial stress.
Chapter 2: “Benign Effects of Automation: New Evidence from Patent Texts"
– in joint work with Katja Mann – studies the effect of automation on labor mar-
kets. The question of whether automation will replace workers with machines
has been discussed as early as Ricardo (1821) and academic findings resurface
periodically in public debates on this issue. Yet, to make progress on this issue,
we need good measurements of automation.
This project starts from the observation that existing indicators of automation
technology have undesirable properties. Some automation proxies suffer from
already imposing what the effects of automation are. Other studies use data
on firm activities, but this is only remotely related to the underlying trends in
technology. Instead, we make use of patents to track innovations in automation
technology. Patents are a rich information source, however researchers usually
only use their metadata, such as names of innovators or their citation counts
(Griliches, 1990). In contrast, we analyze the actual texts of all 5 million patents
granted in the United States between 1976 and 2014. Our text classification
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algorithm learns to recognize automation patents from a sample of 560 patents
and we show that the share of automation patents has risen strongly from 25 to
67 percent of all patents. We identify industries where automation patents are
likely to be used and assign patents to regions in the United States.
We rely on an identification strategy that puts three layers of separation be-
tween where and why patents originate from how they are applied. First, we
disentangle the industries of invention from those of patent use. Second, we
study national patenting and local economic effects as it is unlikely that idiosyn-
cratic conditions in small regions will affect national inventive activity. Third,
we identify patent owners and show similar results for automation patents from
foreigners, universities and governments – groups, whose innovations are less
likely to be motivated by US business interests. We document positive effects of
automation technology on employment across local labor markets. This effect is
driven by an increase in service sector jobs, which more than compensates for a
fall in manufacturing employment.
Chapter 3: “Patterns of Panic: Financial Crisis Language in Historical News-
papers" is similar to the first in methodology, but not in content. It addresses
a long-standing problem in economic history and macroeconomics: There is no
accepted measurement for when financial crises occurred. Researchers depend
on financial stress indicators to study the reasons why such events happen and
the effects they have on society and the economy. The existing literature relies
on a wide array of data, such as narrative accounts by historians or financial
market data. In contrast, this paper builds on newspaper reporting.
Newspapers have been around for a long time and are published continuously
and on a daily frequency. Other studies, such as Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016),
have also used newspaper data. My approach is different in that I make use of a
previously untapped archive of 35 million titles of newspaper articles, published
by five major US newspapers since the 19th century. This allows me to go much
further than the comparable literature as I am able to analyze the full-texts of
titles and am not constrained to using online search masks. I identify articles
that report negatively about financial markets and measure the emotional con-
notation of titles using established sentiment dictionaries with a total of 11,000
words.
The resulting indicator series displays plausible behavior and comoves strongly
with other financial stress indicators. I validate the indicator using 23,000manu-
ally coded articles. A time series analysis shows that spikes in the new indicator
are followed by lower production, higher unemployment, lower stock market
returns and higher credit spreads.
Chapter 4: “Unexpectedly Broke: Expectation Errors and Credit Cycles" –
coauthored with Carsten Detken, Anna Kalbhenn and Eric Persson – follows the
References | 3
train of thought from the second chapter, but concentrates on another facet of
the issue of financial stress. A robust finding in the literature on financial crises is
that these events tend to be preceded by booms in private debt (Schularick and
Taylor, 2012). But the question remains, why people accumulate such excessive
debts in the first place. A mechanism that has been proposed is that agents in the
economy might become overoptimistic about the future course of the economy
and their income paths in boom times. This may entice them to take on too
much debt.
To investigate this hypothesis, we collect a dataset of 2.6 million macroeconomic
forecasts by banks and research institutes with a large international coverage of
32 countries since 1989. A fixed effects panel data analysis shows that expecta-
tions were overoptimistic in exactly those periods when credit in the economy
expanded. This is the case for households, but not for firms, and thus points to
a role of biased expectation formation of the former. This pattern holds for both
industrialized and developing countries and is robust to controlling for the state
of the business cycle, inflation expectations and current interest rates.
We provide further evidence that participants are overprecise, which means they
are unreasonably confident about their predictions. Using a method by Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2012) to analyze information processing, we compare fore-
cast revisions with forecast errors for individual forecasters. In this way, we show
that forecasters – in particular in the run-up to the global financial crisis starting
in 2007 – overreacted to recent positive news across the world.
References
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2Benign Eects of Automation:
New Evidence From Patent Texts
Joint with Katja Mann
2.1 Introduction
What is the effect of automation technology on employment? The answer to
this question is not obvious: While machines may replace workers, new jobs
could also be created. For example, if self-driving vehicles become widely used,
taxi and truck drivers might lose their jobs. Other sectors such as retail could,
however, experience employment growth through lower transport costs.
To identify the employment effects of automation, this paper introduces a new
indicator of automation technology. The large literature addressing this question
has so far relied on indirect proxies of automation, such as routine task input
(Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Goos and
A. Manning (2007), Autor and Dorn (2013)), investment in computer capital
(Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis, 2010; Michaels, Natraj, and van Reenen, 2014)
or investment in robots (Graetz and Michaels, 2015; Acemoglu and Restrepo,
2017). Many of these papers find evidence for job polarization, but the smaller
literature on aggregate employment changes reports more ambiguous results.
This may be due to difficulties in measuring automation comprehensively.
Our proposed automation indicator relies on patent grant texts. Patents are a
natural candidate for measuring technological progress and frequently serve as
proxies of innovation. However, few studies examine the consequences of techno-
logical progress through patents. Also, while patent meta-data such as citation
counts or the identity of innovators is used regularly (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajten-
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berg, 2001; Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Celik, 2014; Bell, Chetty, Jaravel, Petkova,
and Reenen, 2017), the actual patent texts have not been in the focus so far.
We classify patents as automation patents if their texts describe physical inven-
tions (such as robots) or immaterial or conceptual inventions (such as software),
which carry out a process independently of human interference.
We extract the texts of all 5 million U.S. patents granted between 1976 and 2014
and train a machine learning algorithm on a sample of 560 manually classified
patents to sort patents into automation and non-automation innovations. As a
result, we document a strong rise in both the absolute and the relative number
of automation patents. As a share of total patents, automation patents have in-
creased from 25 percent in 1976 to 67 percent in 2014. Applying a probabilistic
matching that is based on Canadian patents, we link patents to the 956 4-digit
SIC industries where they are likely to be used. In this way, we quantify trends
in newly available technology at the industry level.
Next, we compare the indicator to establishedmeasures of automation. The num-
ber of automation patents is positively correlated across industries both with
investment in computer capital and with robots shipments. More automation
patents have been granted in industries with a larger share of employment in
routine occupations in 1960, a result that is in line with the literature on routine-
biased technological change. Also, industries with more automation patents
were characterized by a rise in non-routine cognitive and non-routine interactive
task input and a fall in routine cognitive and routine manual task input.
To estimate the labor-market effects of automation, we transfer our industry-
level data to U.S. commuting zones through industry-county employment
counts. Commuting zones approximate local labor markets as workers tend to
look for jobs within commuting distance from where they live. We obtain a
panel dataset of new automation technology across 722 commuting zones over
39 years. Up to the late 1980s, there was a higher density of automation in the
Great Lakes region, but automation technology has become less geographically
concentrated over time.
Our empirical analysis benefits from the fact that we examine local economic
outcomes which are impacted by, but unlikely to affect, the innovation activity
of industries at the national level. Our key assumption is that commuting zone-
specific developments in the medium-run do not affect automation innovation in
industries that operate there. This is plausible for the following reasons: First, we
separate the industries where patents originate from where they are used. Sec-
ond, many patents belong to foreigners and universities who respond to other
incentives than local firms. And third, local industries are small in comparison
to national aggregate industries. Our approach thus follows Bartik (1991).
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Our main econometric analysis is a fixed effects panel regression for five-year
periods. Interpreting the automation index as a flow measure of technology, we
assess the relationship between the sum of automation and changes in employ-
ment. While we find a positive effect of automation on total employment, this
is driven by job growth in the service sector, which compensates for a fall in
manufacturing employment. This result is robust to adding a variety of other
economic and demographic controls and to weighting patents by the number
of citations they received. We also consider separately patents belonging to spe-
cific groups of assignees: universities and public research institutes, foreigners
and governments. All three should be less responsive to US labor market trends
than US companies. Our results hold in the regressions for the subgroups of
patentees as well as in an instrumental variable regression. Lastly, we find that
automation is associated with more job creation in commuting zones where the
share of routine occupations is low.
All in all, our study thus shows automation to be more beneficial for employ-
ment than some of the previous literature (Autor et al., 2015; Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2017), which might be due to our broader definition of automation.
Our results are in line with Gregory, Salomons, and Zierahn (2016), who show
that the detrimental substitution effect of automation on routine jobs is more
than compensated by a positive labor demand effect due to larger product de-
mand.
In the final part of our paper, we apply our indicator to replicate two central pa-
pers (Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2015)) that study
the influence of automation on labor markets using the routine task share of jobs.
First, we show that non-college employment rose in commuting zones where
more automation patents could be used and where more people worked in rou-
tine occupations. Second, we find that automation leads to rises in employment
levels even when controlling for Chinese import competition, which stands in
contrast to Autor et al. (2015). We provide further evidence that employment
increases were driven to a larger extent by flows into the labor force than by a
fall in unemployment.
There are strengths and weaknesses to our approach to quantifying automa-
tion technology. Text classification is an inherently imprecise activity and we
introduce further inaccuracies through probabilistic matchings of patents to in-
dustries and commuting zones. Also, we make assumptions on the usefulness
of patents and the way they are implemented. On the upside, we have to im-
pose fewer ex-ante assumption on the nature of advances in automation tech-
nology, compared to the literature using routine task shares or computer and
robot investment. Our indicator allows us to closely track the technology fron-
tier, translating newly granted patents into a fine-grained industry- or commut-
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ing zone-level dataset. With these caveats in mind, we consider our indicator a
complement to previous measures of automation.
2.2 New Automation Index
This section introduces the new automation index. We start by arguing why
patents are a suitable data source for measuring technological progress and then
define automation. We show how we construct the indicator and how the classi-
fication algorithm works. Then, we explain how to link patents to industries in
which they are likely to be used. The resulting indicator traces the technology
frontier across 956 industries and 39 years and displays plausible co-movement
with existing indicators of automation such as computer investment, the number
of robots used in production and the share of routine tasks across industries.
2.2.1 Patents As Indicators of Technological Progress
The purpose of patents is to encourage innovation and technological progress
by offering a temporary monopoly on an invention. Once granted, no one can
re-engineer, create or sell the same object or idea. In return, the text of the
patent is made publicly available. The language in the patent text is technical
and highly standardized. Applicants have an incentive to provide exact and cor-
rect information about their innovation to obtain full protection of their ideas.
Professional patent examiners judge a patent’s claims and make changes where
appropriate. In return for disclosing the content of the innovation to the pub-
lic, an intellectual property right is granted for 20 years. To be patentable, an
innovation must be novel, non-obvious and useful. The description must further
be exact and detailed enough to allow for replication and it must name the in-
vention’s most important application. All these characteristics make patents a
valuable data source.
Researchers in economics have made frequent use of patents, often in the form
of the database established by Hall et al. (2001). Griliches (1990) provides an
extensive survey of various issues related to using patents in economics. How-
ever, patents are so far usually interpreted as proxies for innovative activity, not
as increments of technological progress whose effects can be studied (for an
overview of the more recent literature, see Nagaoka et al. (2010)). This is re-
lated to the fact that existing research almost exclusively uses patents’ metadata,
such as the location or affiliation of a patentee or a patent’s importance.2
2Patent citations, in particular, are widely applied as indicators of the value of an invention, for
example by Bell et al. (2017).
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Magerman, Looy, and Song (2010) note that there is almost no research which
uses the actual texts of the patent document, although this has been recom-
mended as early as Griliches (1990). An exception is Bessen and Hunt (2007),
who identify software patents by searching patent texts for keywords. Our ap-
proach differs as we do not specify a priori which words to search for, but use
a state-of-the-art text classification algorithm. Also, we apply the derived mea-
sure to study the effects of technology on the labor market, whereas the goal of
Bessen and Hunt (2007) is to characterize firms that file software patents.
In other areas of economics, text search has become common. However, patent
texts hold several advantages for researchers over other document collections:
The precise technical language with a high degree of standardization, the in-
centive to deliver correct information, the additional check through the patent
examiners’ review and the public access to patent grant texts make patents well
suited for text search analysis.
Patent text analysis is common in the private sector for prior art and freedom-
to-operate searches by firms and lawyers. However, none of these providers –
to the best of our knowledge – offers a comparison of technological trends over
time, which leads us to develop our own approach.
2.2.2 Patent Data
We obtain all 5 million utility patent documents granted in the United States
from 1976 to 2014 from Google.3 While Europe, Japan and increasingly China
are also important patent legislations, of the roughly 10.9 million patents ef-
fective (“in force”) worldwide in 2014, the largest fraction (about one fourth)
had been granted in the United States (WIPO, 2016). In addition, the most im-
portant innovations are usually patented in all major patent legislations. These
properties make U.S. patents a good proxy for the technological frontier in the
United States and beyond. Also, given that this paper studies the effect of au-
tomation in the United States, U.S. patents are an obvious candidate for how
available technology changes.
We only consider utility patents, which account for around 90 percent of all
patents. Utility patents are “issued for the invention of a new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful improve-
ment thereof" (USPTO, 2015). Other patent types are design, plant and reissue
patents and do not track technology that we aim to measure. According to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), in the period 1976-2014,
83 percent of all patents granted were owned by firms – mostly large multina-
tional corporations. 15 percent of patents were owned by individuals and less
3google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents.html
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than 2 percent by the U.S. government. About half of all patents are granted to
foreign applicants, a share that has increased over time. During the period of
our analysis, IBM, Canon and Samsung were the corporations with the largest
number of patents granted (USPTO, 2014).
The patent grant document includes the title, patent number, name of the inven-
tor, date, citations of other patents, legal information, drawings, abstract and a
detailed description, as well as information on the technology class of the inven-
tion. Every patent is assigned one or more technology classification numbers by
the patent examiner which describes technological and functional characteris-
tics of a patent and on which we base our link from patents to industries. We
exclude chemical and pharmaceutical patents from our classification.⁴ The over-
whelming majority of these patents do not meet our definition of an automation
patent (14 out of 560 manually classified patents were automation patents from
those sectors), but including these patents might distor our classification.
2.2.3 Denition of Automation
We define an automation patent to describe a device that carries out a process
independently.⁵ This broad definition captures technologies such as software, a
robot used in a production or the self-driving vehicle mentioned in the intro-
duction. The “device" can be a physical machine, a combination of machines,
an algorithm or a computer program. The process it automates may be a pro-
duction process, but also anything else where an input is altered to generate an
output. An important element of the definition is the notion of independence:
It works without human intervention, except at the start or for supervision. We
require the automation innovation to be a reasonably complete process, product
or machine. In addition, we require it to have an at least remotely-recognizable
application. This excludes inventions that are minor parts of an automation in-
novation and highly abstract patents with no obvious application. We make no
difference between process and product innovations, so an automation patent
could describe either. Table 2.1 displays some examples of automation and non-
automation patents.
⁴Excluded USPC technology numbers: 127, 252, 423, 424, 435, 436, 502, 510-585, 800, 930, 987.
⁵This is a standard definition that can be found in encyclopedias. For example, the Encyclope-
dia Britannica defines automata as “any of various mechanical objects that are relatively self-
operating after they have been set in motion" and adds that “the term automaton is also applied
to a class of electromechanical devices—either theoretical or real—that transform information
from one form into another on the basis of predetermined instructions or procedures" (Encyclopæ-
dia Britannica (2015)).
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Table 2.1. Examples of Automation and Non-automation Patents
Patent title Patent number Automation patent?
“Automatic taco machine" 5531156 Yes
“Color measuring method and device" 6362849 Yes
“Coinfusion apparatus" 8857476 Yes
“Hair dye applicator " 6357449 Yes
“Hand-held scanner having adjustable light path" 5552597 No
“Bicycle frame with device cavity" 7878521 No
“Process for making pyridinethione salts" 4323683 No
“Golf ball" 4173345 No
Note: Authors’ classications according to manual coding guidelines.
2.2.4 Classication of Patents
Based on the definition above, all patents can be classified as either automation
or non-automation patents. We use an automated approach. To train a classifi-
cation algorithm, we need reliable and objective classifications on which we can
base the comparison. To this end, we manually classify 560 randomly drawn
patents according to rules laid out in manual coding guidelines.⁶ We aim to
minimize coding mistakes and biases by providing a structured classification
process, by classifying patents in random order and by reviewing every classifi-
cation by a second person.
The language in patent texts might have changed over time. But patents from
the 1970s read very similar to those from the 2000s and important technological
classes such as computers and robots are developed and patented throughout
the sample period. The technical nature of the documents and the fact that
legal terms change more slowly than other language also makes it less likely
that there are short-lived trends that could pose a problem for a classification
based on specific terms.
From our sample of patents, we extract word stems, called tokens, with the
Porter2 stemming algorithm. This shortens “automation", “automated", “auto-
matically", “automatable" to “automat". Table 2.2 summarizes these tokens. A
typical title contains about 5 tokens, a typical abstract about 36 and the rest of
the patent (the “body”) about 500 to 600.
⁶See: http://lukaspuettmann.com/assets/pdf/manual_coding_guidelines.pdf
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Table 2.2. Tokens in 560 Manually Classied Patents
Part All tokens Unique tokens Mean Median
Title 2796 1301 4.99 5
Abstract 20781 3971 37.11 36
Body 339366 31499 606.01 506.5
In principle, one could now record for all 5 million patents whether they contain
one of the roughly 32,000 tokens that we can assign probabilities to. But to keep
the computation-intensive data collection feasible and to remove noise features,
we use the mutual information criterion to extract those tokens which are most
informative about which class a patent belongs to. This is an established statistic
for feature selection which prefers tokens that appear significantly more often
in one of the classes and punishes tokens that appear rarely overall (C. D. Man-
ning et al., 2009). We then pick the highest ranked (according to the mutual
information criterion) 50 title tokens, 200 abstract tokens and 500 patent body
tokens. The final search dictionary consists of 623 tokens.
Figure 2.1 visualizes the 150 tokens with the highest mutual information cri-
terion. The most important token is unsurprisingly “automat”. After that come
“output”, “execut”, “inform”, “input” and “detect”. Some tokens are indicative of
software, such as “microprocessor”, “database”, “comput”, “program” or “trans-
miss". Others aremore likely to appear in descriptions of physical machines, such
as “motor”, “move”, “metal” or “apparatus”. The last discernible group of tokens
are action verbs that appear in descriptions of a wide range of independently
operating devices, such as “distinguish”, “command”, “respons” or “perform”.
Figure 2.1.Words That Indicate an Automation Patent
Note: Token size is proportional to the value of themutual information criterion
in sample 560 classied patents. We show only the 150 highest ranked tokens
excluding chemical and pharmaceutical words.
Source: USPTO, Google and own calculations.
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Our algorithm emulates how a human being would have classified each patent.
We apply the Naive Bayes algorithm which is a supervised learning method
which is easy to interpret and which computationally scales well with large
amounts of data. The “naive” assumption the probability of a token to appear
in a document is independent from the appearance of other tokens. Despite
its simplicity it has been shown to perform quite well (Domingos and Pazzani,
1997).⁷ One reason for this that the low number of parameters it estimates make
it unlikely to overfit (Murphy, 2012). The assumption of tokens appearing inde-
pendently of each other also makes this classifier more robust to conceptual drift
than other methods such as k-nearest neighbors (C. D. Manning et al., 2009).
C. D. Manning et al. (2009) explain how this algorithm picks the class c for every
document d with maximum a posteriori probability P(c | d). In our analysis, the
documents d correspond to patent grant texts and the two different classes are
automation patents and non-automation patents. In the Bernoulli Naive Bayes
that we use, every document d is represented by a vector e, where entry ei
(i = 1, . . . ,M) is 1 if token i appears at least once in the document and 0 if it
does not. Patent texts contain matter-of-fact language, where words are often
repeated. So the occurrence of a word is more important than the frequency of
its appearance and we therefore ignore how often a word appears in a document.
According to this language model, in any document in class c the token ei occurs
with conditional probability P(ei | c). Therefore, the probability of a document
d to show up in class c is
P(d | c) =
∏
1≤i≤M
P(ei | c), (2.1)
and the conditional probability of document d to belong to class c is according
to Bayes’ rule⁸
P(c | d) ∝ P(c) ∏
1≤i≤M
P(ei | c). (2.2)
We estimate the prior bP(c) as the relative frequency of documents in class c
in the training set. This is bP(autom)= 147483 = 0.304, as about a third of eligible
⁷Gentzkow et al. (2017) also recommend this algorithm if the number of observed features (to-
kens) is much larger than the size of the training sample, as is the case in our analysis.
⁸P(c | d)= P(c)P(d|c)P(d) ∝ P(c)P(d | c).
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patents (i.e., after removing chemical and pharmaceutical patents) were manu-
ally labeled as automation patents. We then estimate the conditional probabili-
ties of a certain token to occur in class c, bP(ei | c) asbP(ei | c) = bP(i | c)ei + (1 – bP(i | c))(1 – ei), (2.3)
where bP(i | c) is the share of documents with token i in class c. In this way, we
calculate posterior probabilities for all 5 million patents to belong to either class
and assign each patent to the class with the higher posterior probability.






l No 323 88 411
Yes 25 124 149
348 212 560
“No": not automation patent
Table 2.3 shows how human examiners and how the computer algorithm classi-
fied the set of manually investigated patents. Both the manual coding and the
algorithmic classification judged around a quarter of patents to be automation
patents. In 80 percent of cases (= 323+124560 ) both approaches agreed. The prob-
ability of a false positive (type I error) is 21 percent (= 88411). The probability of
a false negative (type II error) is 17 percent (= 25149).
While some share of misclassified patents remains, as long as there is no under-
lying bias in the classication this should only add noise to our indicator series as
we only aim to approximate trends in technology over time. Any noise should
therefore push our empirical results towards zero, making it harder to detect an
effect of automation.
A more precise classification might be possible when including patents’ other
observable characteristics such as their technological class (USPC and IPC num-
bers), grant years, the origins of inventors or the sector of firms. But we keep the
classification into automation and non-automation separate from these observ-
ables to allow comparing automation trends across time and industries, without
making these associations automatic.
2.2.5 Aggregate Properties of the Indicator
Figure 2.2 is a graphical representation of all 5 million patents granted in the
United States between 1976 and 2014. We show patents by when they were
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Classification:  automation rest
1976-2014, annually
Figure 2.2. Patents, 1976-2014
Note: See text for classication of automation patents and assignment of
patents to categories.
Source: USPTO, Google, Hall, Jae, and Trajtenberg (2001) and own calcu-
lations.
granted, not when applied for, as inventions are unlikely to be shared before
they are protected by a patent.
There has been a steady increase from 70,000 granted patents in 1976 to more
than 300,000 patents in 2014. Over the whole period, we classify 2.2 million
of these as automation patents. The red-shaded parts of the bars show the
patents which we classified as automation patents and blue colors signal all
other patents. We observe a sharp upward trend in automation patents from
16,000 in 1976 to 180,000 in 2014. The share of patents related to automation
also increased, from 25 percent of patents in 1976 to 67 percent of patents in
2014. Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix provides the yearly numbers.
Figure 2.2 further split up into broad categories of patents based on an aggrega-
tion method by Hall et al. (2001) which relies on the technological classification
(USPC number) of patents.⁹ Patents in the sub-category computers and commu-
nication have becomemuchmore frequent over the sample period andwemostly
classify them as automation. Many of these are likely software patents. Electri-
cal, electronic and mechanical patents also contribute significantly to the stock
of automation patents. Robots, for example, fall in this category. By design, most
⁹Note that this is a different classification than the one we will employ to match patents to the
industries they are likely to be used in. See section 2.2.6.
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Figure 2.3. Ratio of Posteriors
Note: Every individual patent is classied as automation if ratio of posterior is greater
than one. The gure shows smoothed densities by Hall et al. (2001) technological cate-
gory and by decade.
Source: USPTO, Google, Hall, Jae, and Trajtenberg (2001) and own calculations.
chemical and pharmaceutical patents are not classified as automation patents,
but they make up a large portion of the non-automation patents.
After our applying our algorithm, every patent has a posterior probability of be-
longing to either class automation or the rest. The ratio of these two posteriors
is a sign of how strongly the method recommends putting a patent in either
class. We plot the distribution of these ratios in Figure 2.3, separately for the
four decades our dataset spans. What becomes obvious that all densities apart
from “Computers & Communications" peak to the left of the vertical line, so most
of the patents are not classified as automation. The distribution for “Computers
& Communications" moves further to the right as time progresses, a sign that
more of these patents become automation, but it could also mean that we cap-
ture later software patents better than earlier ones. The category “Electrical &
Electronic" also has a second peak to the right of the vertical line, but there is no
shift over time. The categories “Chemical" and “Drugs & Medical" are shown for
completeness, but most of them we will assign to the non-automation category.
The rise in the total number of patents granted is a potential concern for the in-
terpretation of the time-dimension of patent texts. If the nature of patents had
changed in parallel with the number, so if the increase in patents is due to some-
thing else than an increase in research productivity, the datamight not be compa-
rable across time. An increase in the number of automation patents would then
not be interpretable as an increase in automation technology. Kortum and Lerner
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(1999) evaluate different possible explanations for why the number of patent
grants has changed: increased patent protection due to patentee-friendly court
rulings, regulatory capture by large firms that patent eagerly, new technology
fields producing patentable inventions (e.g., information technology, biotech-
nology and financial intermediation) and more applied research. The authors
refute all hypotheses except for the increase in research productivity. This result
is in line with an OECD survey (OECD (2004)) in which 94 percent of surveyed
firms responded that an increase in the number of inventions was an impor-
tant or very important driver of their increased patenting activity (66 percent
very important). In contrast, changes in patentability played only a minor role.
We therefore conclude that the quality of patents granted has not changed over
time and that we do not need to worry about any distortive effects of a change in
grant numbers. As an additional check, we compute a deflated version of our in-
dicator, for which we divide the number of automation patents in each industry
and year by the total number of patents granted in that specific year relative to
the number of patents granted in 1990. The resulting measure is an automation
count in units of 1990 patents, which takes higher values for earlier years and
lower values for later years than the original measure. Our empirical results in
section 2.4 are insensitive to the time deflation.
2.2.6 From Patents to Industries
Various researchers have proposed matchings of patents to industries. Hall et al.
(2001) identify firms filing for patents and Lybbert and Zolas (2014) propose an
automated approach that compares descriptions of industries with descriptions
of patents’ technological classes. The OECD (2011) reviews these techniques in
more detail and Griliches (1990) describes the difficulties in matching patents
to industries.
However, we are interested in how automation technology affects labor markets.
Therefore, we aim to find the industries where automation patents are used, not
where they originate. These two need not be the same, so that the industry of
the patentee is not necessarily the industry we want to assign the patent to. As
an example, IBM owns many patents that are not used in the computer industry,
but by companies in the manufacturing or in the retail sector. These patents are
either sold or licensed out. Attributing them to the computer industry would
overstate the automation intensity there, while understating it in the other sec-
tors.
Linking patents to the industries of their use is difficult. If we wanted to measure
the actual usage of a specific patent in a certain industry, we would need data on
out-licensing. But this information is not available, as firms and research insti-
tutions have incentives to keep their licensing agreements private. Interpreting
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Table 2.4. Automation Patents Across Industries of Use
Industries Manufac- Automation Share SICs
turing patents (1000s) (1987)
Computers 3 499 88% 357
Other electronics 3 250 46% 36*
Measuring instruments; watches 3 193 60% 38
Telephones and telegraphs 3 185 68% 3661
Machines 3 183 40% 35*
Hospitals 137 46% 8062
Househ. audio and video equip. 3 104 69% 3651
Other services 118 47% 70-89*
Transportation equipment 3 115 39% 37
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, oil 3 101 18% 28, 30, 29
Utilities (transport, gas, sanitary) 57 44% E
Fabricated metal products 3 51 33% 34
Medical laboratories 37 64% 8071
Construction 34 24% C
Printing publishing; paper 3 34 32% 26, 27
Metal, stone, clay, glass, concrete 3 29 22% 32, 33
Retail and wholesale trade 26 32% G, F
Agriculture, forestry and shing 24 33% A
R&D, management 3 23 64% 87
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 20 38% 39
Public administration; nance 20 47% J, H
Food, tobacco 3 19 24% 20, 21
Mining 16 37% B
Apparel, wood, furniture 3 15 17% 22-25, 31
total 2,290 46%
Note: Sums of patents 1976-2014. Patents are counted if they can be used in an
industry, as described in text. An asterisk * indicates that some subindustries are
shown separately.
Source: USPTO, Google, Silverman (2002) and own calculations.
patents more indirectly as a proxy for automation technology rather than a direct
measure, we can use information about the areas in which patents can poten-
tially be applied. There have been attempts by Schmookler (1966) and Scherer
(1984) to manually classify patents and link them to industries of use, but this
would not be feasible for a large number of patents. Patent offices themselves
usually do not provide information on the link of patents to industries. How-
ever, we benefit from an exception to this rule by the Canadian patent office.
Between 1978 and 1993, Canadian patent officers assigned industries of use for
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all granted patents. Based on this information, Kortum and Putnam (1997) as-
sembled the “Yale Technology Concordance”, a way to link patents through their
technological classification to the industries in which they are likely to be used.
This is based on the assumption that the pattern linking patents’ technological
class to industries of use should be similar in Canada and the United States. We
use the files provided by Silverman (2002), who calculates empirical frequen-
cies for cross-overs from patent technology classes (IPCs) to 1987 SIC industries
using 148,000 patents granted between 1990 and 1993.1⁰
This allows for a probabilistic matching. We connect a patent to an industry
with the probability of being used in that industry. So if patent A is used in two
industries X and Y, then half the patent count is assigned to industry X and half
to Y. However, patents are often assigned several IPC technology classifications.
In that case, we divide each value for that patent by the number of its IPCs.
So if patent A now is assigned another IPC number, then only a quarter of its
value will now be attributed to industries X and Y each and the rest to industries
in the new IPC. This fractional counting of patents ensures that more general
patents that are assigned to several IPCs do not have get more weight than more
specialized patents that are assigned to fewer IPCs.11
As a result, we obtain an annual dataset of new patents and new automation
patents that can be used in 956 industries and over 39 years. Table 2.4 dis-
plays all automation patents by industries of use over the whole time period
1976-2014. (The totals differ slightly from Appendix Table 2.A.1 due to round-
ing errors and the probabilistic conversion to patent equivalents as described
before.)
Out of a total of 2.3 million automation patents, 1.8 million (79 percent) are
used in the manufacturing sector (division D in SIC 1987). Half a million au-
tomation patents could be used in the production of computers (SIC 357) which
includes personal computers, mainframes, storage devices, terminals, billingma-
chines, automatic teller machines and peripheral equipment such as printers,
scanners, office equipments or typewriters. The production of electronic devices,
sensors and communication equipment also received a large number of automa-
tion patents. Outside of themanufacturing sector, hospitals, utilities andmedical
laboratories were assigned a large number of automation patents. In large parts
of the economy – such as agriculture, mining, public administration, finance or
1⁰http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/~/silverman/ipcsic/documentation_IPC-
SIC_concordance.htm, accessed 25.10.2015. The fact that we use only data for 1990–1993
means that the matching should be most precise during this period, while becoming less exact
the further away we move from this period. It helps that this periodis in the middle of our sample,
but the fact that patents grow much more near in the later years is some cause for concern.
11This also enables us to interpret the resulting indicator as full patent equivalents which we will
still refer to simply as “patents" in the remainder of the paper.
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retail – only few automation patents were granted. We also calculate the share
of patents used in an industry that we classify as automation. This ratio is high
for the computer industry or communication-related industries and is low for
the chemical industry or “Apparel, wood, furniture".
In our following empirical analysis, we interpret these indices as worker inten-
sities by fully assigning all new (automation) patents in an industry to each
person employed in that industry and year. This is equivalent to assuming that
patents assigned to an industry will potentially be used by everyone working
in that industry. If we considered our indicator narrowly as an exact measure
of the use of patents in the production process, this would not be a realistic as-
sumption. But to us, a patent is just one part of an innovation process that will
produce many types of outputs. Being a measurable outcome of this process,
patents serve as a proxy for it.In our regressions we will use the total number of
automation patents as our main explanatory variable, but we will also control
for the amount of all other patents that can be used in an industry.
2.3 Comparison with Previous Automation Proxies
Next, we analyze how our new industry measure of automation technology is
related to established automation indicators. Previous proxies of automation dif-
fer from ours along two lines. First, they are indicators of realized automation in
the production process, not indicators of automation technology. Second, most
capture only one specific facet of automation technology, such as computers or
robots, while our indicator incorporates both and even allows delineating it from
other kinds of technological progress.
As a measure of computerization, studies use survey data of computer use at
the workplace (Autor et al. (2003), Beaudry et al. (2010)) or industry-level
investment in computer capital (Autor et al. (2003), Michaels et al. (2014)).
Frey and Osborne (2017) manually assess the probability of computerization of
a number of occupations. Akerman et al. (2015) exploit a natural experiment,
the introduction of broadband internet in Norway, to study employment effects
of automation.
As a proxy for physical automation innovations, Graetz and Michaels (2015),
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) and Dauth et al. (2017) count the number of
robots used in production, a dataset assembled by the International Federation
of Robotics. Lewis (2011) applies a more general understanding of automation
by looking at adoption rates for new automation technologies, but with limited
coverage of industries.
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Figure 2.4. Comparison with Other Indicators of Automation
Note:NIPA computer investment is themean of 1976-2001 inmillions of 1996U.S. dollars,
ASM computer investment is the mean of 2002-2014 in thousands of 2009 U.S. dollars.
Robots is the mean number of robot shipments in the U.S. over 2003-2014 (U.S. data for
2003-2010 are imputed from North America data). Automation patents are counted for
the same time period as the respective comparison data. All three gures show binscat-
ters of log values.
Source: USPTO, Google, Silverman (2002), NIPA, ASM and IRF (2014).
To show how our index relates to some of these measures, Figure 2.4 corre-
lates automation patents with investment in computer capital and shipments
of robots. We use two different data sources for investment in computer capi-
tal: The National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which provides annual
data until 2001 for 71 2- and 3-digit SIC industries and the Annual Survey of
Manufactures (ASM), which is available annually from 2002 onwards and for
465 4-digit SIC industries, the majority of them being manufacturing industries.
As a measure of robots, we use the dataset on robot shipments by the Interna-
tional Federation of Robotics, which is provided at an annual frequency for North
America starting from 2004 for 24 SIC industries. All correlations are highly pos-
itive, which indicates that our automation measure captures both advances in
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robotics and in software, which are then translated into production and trade
of computers and robots.
Another way to contextualize our indicator is to evaluate how it relates to the
nature of jobs. A large strand of literature, pioneered by Autor et al. (2003),
analyzes the labor market effects of automation based on the assumption that
automated machines are good at carrying out repeated tasks and fail at complex
intellectual or manual tasks. For each occupation, they calculate what share
of a job comprises routine (manual or cognitive) tasks. The resulting routine-
task index thus measures the outcome of automation given specific – theory-
and data-supported – assumptions. Weighing the index by occupation-specific
employment, Autor et al. (2003) further create a routine task intensity measure
across 140 industries from 1960 to 1998, based onwhich they show that changes
in routine-task intensity are predicted by investment in computer capital: The
share of non-routine tasks increases, whereas that of routine tasks decreases as
a result of computer investment.
Figure 2.5 plots the routine task share of industries in 1960 against new automa-
tion technology patented between 1976 and 2014.12 The relationship between
automation patents and the routine-task index is positive: The larger the routine
task share of an industry in 1960, the more automation technology was subse-
quently invented, patented and potentially used in that industry in the following
decades. Our indicator thus seems to be capturing the same phenomenon as de-
scribed by the literature on routine-biased technological change.
The correlations between the two variables fell monotonously throughout the
four decades.13 The correlation is strongest in the 1970s to 1980s and declines
over time. We interpret this as a sign that the nature of automation technol-
ogy may have changed: While in the 1970s until 1990s, automation technology
mostly replaced routine tasks, it nowadays spreads into other tasks. This could
be because many routine jobs have already been replaced by automation, so
that additional research in this area is less demanded and less profitable. An-
other possible explanation is that recent advances in the automation technology
frontier affect non-routine workers by being able to replace more complex intel-
lectual or manual tasks. (The self-driving vehicle comes to mind.)
To explore this finding further, we examine the effects of technological change
separately for routine manual, routine cognitive, non-routine analytic and non-
routine interactive tasks. We regress changes in industry task input within each
12Data on routine-task intensities at the industry level is obtained from David Autor’s website eco-
nomics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor (accessed 14.07.2015). Their dataset is for U.S. Census
industries which we translate into SIC industries using a concordance scheme of the U.S. Census
Bureau.
131976-1985: 0.35; 1986-1995: 0.34; 1996-2005: 0.32; 2006-2014: 0.28
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Table 2.5. Automation and Industry Task Input
Outcome: Within-industry change in task input
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-98
∆ Non-routine analytic Auto Technology -0.012 0.033*** 0.011
(0.011) (0.005) (0.014)
Constant 0.068*** 0.110*** 0.139***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019)
R2 0.004 0.019 0.001
∆ Non-routine interactive Auto Technology 0.017* 0.062*** 0.007
(0.010) (0.008) (0.018)
Constant 0.131*** 0.206*** 0.279***
(0.017) (0.030) (0.036)
R2 0.004 0.016 0.000
∆ Routine cognitive Auto Technology -0.032** -0.066*** -0.031***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant -0.081*** -0.185*** -0.254***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.038)
R2 0.008 0.027 0.003
∆ Routine manual Auto Technology -0.010*** -0.022*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.002 -0.058*** -0.095***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
R2 0.008 0.021 0.000
Note: The table presents separate OLS regressions for the subperiods 1970-1980,
1980-1990 and 1990-1998, always using as explanatory variable the average change
of new automation patents between 1976 and 1998 (divided by 1000). The depen-
dent variable is the change in industry-level task input as calculated by Autor et al.
(2003). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
decade on our measure of new automation technology. This is a replication of
a regression analysis by Autor et al. (2003), but we replace investment in com-
puter capital with our index. To stay as close to the analysis of Autor et al. (2003)
as possible we calculate the left-hand side variable separately for 1970-1980,
1980-1990 and 1990-1998 whereas on the right-hand side, we use the mean of
new automation patents over the whole time period from 1976 to 1998.1⁴
1⁴Results are very similar when we use the whole period that our indicator covers, 1976-2014.
Alternatively, we can count only automation patents of the decade for which the change in task
input is calculated. The results stay qualitatively the same. Regression outputs are available from
the authors upon request.
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Figure 2.5. Automation Patents and Routine Labor
Note: Binscatter of log of total number of automation patents in industries
against routine task input share in 1960 across 258 SIC 3-digit industries, 1976-
2014.
Source: Autor et al. (2003) and see text.
Table 2.5 shows that more automation patents were granted in industries where
routine cognitive and routine manual task inputs declined and where the share of
non-routine analytic and non-routine interactive tasks increased. It is noteworthy
that for all four task inputs the effect is strongest in 1980-1990. This differs from
Autor et al. (2003) who found that for routine tasks the effect had monotonically
increased over time.
2.4 Labor Market Eects of Automation Technology
In this section, we first motivate our unit of analysis, local labor markets, be-
fore explaining how we translate our index from industries to U.S. commuting
zones. We show graphically how automation across commuting zones changed
over time. Then, we apply the derived measure in our econometric analysis of
employment effects. In the regression set-up, we rely on fixed effects five-year
overlapping time periods, which we explain in detail before discussing the re-
sults. We run regressions for the full sample and separately for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing employment.
2.4.1 Commuting Zones As Level of Analysis
We study the effects of automation on employment at the level of U.S. com-
muting zones. Tolbert and Sizer (1996) have grouped all counties of the U.S.
mainland into 722 commuting zones which each exhibit strong commuting ties
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within, but weak commuting ties between one another. These regions are meant
to approximate local labor markets. In response to a shock to labor demand,
most adjustments in the short- and medium-run will take place within the local
labor market (Blanchard and Katz (1992), Moretti (2011)). Workers, when laid
off, usually first look for a new job within the same commuting zone. This is
particularly true for low-skill workers, who are likely to be affected the most by
automation (Notowidigdo (2011)). Therefore, studying the effects of automa-
tion on employment on the level of commuting zones gives us a more complete
picture of the employment effects of automation than an industry-level analy-
sis, which would neglect worker flows from one industry to another. This is of
particular relevance because of the substantial shift of employment from manu-
facturing to services in the sample period.
We use employment data by the County Business Patterns (CBP) to convert
patents per industry to worker patent automation intensities on a commuting
zone level.1⁵ To create the commuting zone measure of automation, we first
take (one plus) the natural logarithm of industry-level automation patents in
order to account for the different levels of patenting across industries: In some
industries the pace of technological progress is too fast for patents to be a feasi-
ble way to protect innovations, while in others, inventors have strategic reasons
not to file for a patent. We then divide the employment-weighted sum of au-






i ln(1 + automation patentsi,t)Li,c,t
Lc,t
, (2.4)
where L is employment, i stands for industry, c for commuting zone and t for
time period.
Figure 2.6 shows the number of automation patents per worker across U.S. com-
muting zones in four subperiods: 1976-85, 1986-95, 1996-2005 and 2006-14.
The colors represent four quartiles of the distribution of automation intensity
(in levels) in these subperiods: dark red color signals the 25 percent of com-
muting zones with the most patents, white color signals the 25 percent with
the least patents. The map thus indicates which commuting zones have a high
1⁵In this dataset, employment numbers are reported by county and 4-digit SIC (6-digit NAICS) in-
dustry. In contrast to Census data, which is sometimes used for commuting zone analysis, CBP
provides annual data for the whole period of analysis. Agriculture (SIC < 1000) and public ad-
ministration (SIC > 9000) are excluded from CBP. To avoid imprecision due to SIC-NAICS cor-
respondences and missing CBP employment data for some particular industries, we aggregate
employment and the automation index on the 3-digit SIC level before matching.
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or low share of patents relative to the rest of the United States in the specific
sub-period.1⁶
There are pronounced regional patterns in the dispersion of available automa-
tion technology. Between 1976 and 1995, the region around the Great Lakes had
a large automation patent intensity relative to the rest of the United States. This
stems from the conjunction of both a high number of patents in manufacturing
industries and a large share of industrial employment in this area. Starting in
the mid-1990s, many commuting zones in this region move to a lower quartile
as the number of manufacturing employees decreased relative to the number of
employees in sectors with fewer patents. But our map of automation density is
not simply a reflection of the manufacturing share. In a particular the Southern
United States have lower potential automation use than would be expected from
their manufacturing density.
The commuting zones with the highest automation intensities are more dis-
persed in the 1990s and 2000s. Commuting zones in Montana, North and South
Dakota and Nebraska attract many automation patents per employee. The Rocky
Mountain region has a low share of patents throughout the whole sample period.
The map therefore reveals substantial geographic variation over time, which we
exploit in the regression analysis.
1⁶As the legend shows, the absolute number of patents has increased across all quartiles. An indi-
vidual commuting zone may thus have had its absolute number of patents increase constantly
over time, but change from dark red to white because the index increased relatively more slowly









(a) 1976-1985 (b) 1986-1995
(c) 1996-2005 (d) 2006-2014
Figure 2.6. Map of Automation Patent Intensities
Note: Shows averages of the number of national automation patents that can be used by a single
worker.
Source: USPTO, Google, Silverman (2002), CBP and own calculations.
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2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
Our dependent variable is the five-year change in the employment-to-population











where in contrast to automation, we observe employment directly at the
commuting-zone level. We choose a medium term period as new patents might
start to be used by firms only with some lags.1⁷ This also holds the additional
benefit of smoothing out business cycle effects.
The main explanatory variable is the five-year sum of the automation intensity
in a commuting zone:
∑4
s=0 autointc,t–s. By using sums, we interpret patents as
a flow measure of technology and therefore, the five-year sum of new patents is
the five-year difference in the stock of patents.
In our econometric analysis we ask the following question: What is the impact
of newly available nationwide automation technology on changes in the employ-
ment structure at the local level? In order to answer this question causally, we
need to argue convincingly that our automation measure is exogenous to em-
ployment changes. The main potential source of endogeneity is that in their
research activity, firms may be reacting to local developments, for example
changes in labor costs, regulations or demand, thus introducing a reverse causal-
ity bias. There are several reasons why this is less of a concern for us:
Automation by industry of use: Assigning patents to the industries where they
are likely to be used, not filed, weakens the danger of reverse causality: The
research effort of a firm in one industry is less directly linked to employment
trends in another industry than, for example, data on actual investment in au-
tomation technology. Additionally, many patents are granted to universities, re-
search institutes or individuals that might follow other objectives than profit
maximization, for example intellectual curiosity or an interest in advancing sci-
ence. These sources of innovation are of relevance, as in year 2000 about 7000
patent licenses to firms were issued by U.S. universities and U.S. public research
institutions (OECD, 2003). Further, around half of the patents granted by the
USPTO are filed by foreign applicants. This reduces the potential for a feedback
from industry wage structure to innovative activity, as a patent from, for exam-
ple, a manufacturer in Japan is less likely to respond to employment conditions
in the manufacturing industry in the United States.
1⁷Results are robust to changing the length of a period.
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National innovation, local effects: We measure innovations at the level of na-
tional industries, whereas we observe employment changes locally. Our con-
structed commuting zone automation measure is thus a proxy for unobserved
locally applicable innovation in the spirit of Bartik (1991), as recently explained
by Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift (2017). A national industry is unlikely
to react to local employment trends in its research activity unless the following
conditions hold: First, the specific commuting zone is of key importance to the
industry (by hosting a large share of industry employment) and second, the in-
dustry is represented strongly in the commuting zone, so that industry trends
will translate directly into commuting zone employment trends. These condi-
tions do not drive our findings: In our sample, only two commuting zones are
above the 25 percent double threshold (CZ 35002 in Arizona and CZ 37601 in
Nevada, in both of which mining is dominant) and only 34 commuting zones are
above the 10 percent double threshold. Excluding these does not significantly
change the results.
Fixed industry structure: We fix the employment structure in equation (2.4)
to the beginning of each five-year period. This means that in the following five
years we assign all patents to a commuting zone according to the initial employ-
ment share of relevant industries in this commuting zone. Our indicator thus
does not pick up employment changes that happen within the five-year period.
A downside of keeping the employment structure fixed is that we potentially do
not count all those patents which workers in a commuting zone can use, but
might over-represent declining and under-represent growing industries.1⁸
Additionally, in Secion 2.4.6 we exploit information on the owners of patents in
order to identify innovations that more likely result from research effort that is
unrelated to trends in US labor markets. We show that our baseline regression
results hold when focusing only on patents held by foreigners, governments or
universities and public research institutes, or when using these as instruments
for the patents held by US companies.
2.4.3 Regression Set-up
We consider changes in overlapping five-year time periods and the sample there-
fore comprises 34 consecutive five-year periods across 722 commuting zones.1⁹
1⁸The results are however robust to using an adaptive industry structure.
1⁹The overlapping data structure generates serial correlation. We correct the standard errors by
using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator, which corrects both for serial and spacial correla-
tion. An alternative would be to use non-overlapping time periods. But not only would this mean
losing a considerable amount of observations (and thus precision), but it would also require us
to choose cut-off points for the five-year intervals, which would always be to some extent arbi-
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+ X ′c,t–5 β5 + "c,t,t–5 , (2.5)
where γt are time fixed effects and αk are state fixed effects. Xc,t–5 are addi-
tional control variables. The main variable of interest autoint is automation in-
tensity, non-autoint is the intensity of any non-automation patents and routine is
the routine task share which we describe below. To construct the left-hand side
variable, we take county level population data from the Census Population and
Housing Unit Estimates and county-level employment data from CBP. Because
the CBP omits employment in some SIC industries for certain years, there are
a few large jumps in the outcome variable, which we exclude from the analysis
by dropping data below the 1th and beyond the 99th percentile in each year.2⁰
In addition to commuting zone intensities of automation patents, we include in-
tensities of non-automation patents (non-autoint) in the regression, computed
analogously to equation (2.4). This variable controls for the effect of techno-
logical change other than in automation technology. Given that some industries
generally patent more, it is likely that the number of automation patents and
non-automation patents granted annually are correlated across industries and
commuting zones. At the same time, non-automation inventions may also have
an independent effect on employment. In particular, they may be interpreted as
an indicator for local growth potential, which we might otherwise suspect to be
accountable for correlations between automation and employment: If growing
industries increase their workforce as well as invest more in R&D, this should be
reflected by the coefficient on non-autoint.
As described in Section 2.3, an often-used measure of susceptibility to automa-
tion is the routine-task index by Autor et al. (2003). The different construction
of this measure from ours creates the opportunity to explore how the effects
trary. As shown in the appendix, all main results go through using this more standard estimation
procedure instead.
2⁰For details, see census.gov/program-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation. The num-
ber of commuting zones in each year falls to 708.
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Table 2.6. Summary Statistics of Main Variables in Baseline Regression
Variable Mean Overall Between Within Min Max
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
∆ emp/pop 1.19 2.71 0.710 2.62 -9.40 13.2
∆ manu emp/pop -0.342 1.08 0.457 0.977 -5.35 4.33
∆ non-manu emp/pop 1.53 2.19 0.542 2.12 -8.63 12.9
autoint 16.4 3.02 1.23 2.76 7.63 28.6
non-autoint 18.8 1.89 1.38 1.29 8.88 26.7
routine 34.4 5.32 4.25 3.20 8.51 56.3
of these two are related and to ask the question: How does the effect of au-
tomation depend on the routine task share of a commuting zone? We therefore
include the initial (t – 5) routine task share (routine) in the regression as well
as an interaction term between this measure and the variable for automation
intensity.
We further include the initial share of manufacturing employment in total
employment (CBP) to capture structural change in the economy. Automation
patents occur to a larger extent in the manufacturing sector than in the service
sector, so an increase in the automation index may parallel a decline in the man-
ufacturing industry for other reasons, such as the cheap import of manufactured
goods from abroad or changes in the demand for goods. If not included as a con-
trol, any effect stemming from non-automation-related structural change might
be attributed to automation technology.
Similar to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), our set-up also includes the log of
initial commuting zone population because employment in larger and smaller
commuting zones – in particular when interpreting this as a proxy for urban
vs. rural areas – might react differently to automation. We also control for the
share of non-white citizens in the commuting zone population and for the (log
of) per capita level of personal income. Data on the demographic variables are
taken from the Census Population and Housing Unit Estimates, data on income
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Information Sys-
tem (REIS), which exploits county-level data from administrative records and
censuses.
Table 2.6 summarizes themain variables of interest. Employment per population
grew on average over the sample period.21 Employment changes were negative
21This is mainly driven by increases in female labor market participation, which rose from
47 percent in 1976 to 57 percent in 2014, peaking at 60 percent in 1999. (See the BLS
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on average for the manufacturing sector and positive for the non-manufacturing
sector with more within and across variation for the latter.22 Our automation
intensity measure autoint takes the value 16.4 on average across years and com-
muting zones. This value is equivalent to a commuting zone with a flat industry
structure (i.e., all 377 SIC 3-digit industries having the same employment share)
where 25 new automation patents are granted every year in all industries. Be-
cause patents are skewed across industries, this number will be larger for most
industries.
2.4.4 Estimation Results: Total Employment
Table 2.7 presents the baseline results. Throughout almost all specifications, au-
toint has a significantly positive coefficient in the range of around 0.10 to 0.23
percentage points. So new automation technology per worker is significantly re-
lated to employment gains in the same commuting zone. This result is robust to
controlling for several economic and demographic variables.
Column (1) shows the positive association between automation and employ-
ment when no further controls but time and industry fixed effects are included.
The relationship becomes more pronounced when we control for other non-
automation patents in column (2). Columns (3) shows our preferred regression
specification. The coefficient on autoint in column (3) can be interpreted such
that a one-unit increase in the automation intensity leads to a 0.178 percentage
point increase in the employment-to-population ratio. As laid out in Table 2.6,
this is about one sixth of the average five-year increase across all observations.
The within-year interquartile range of autoint lies between 1.23 and 2.15, so a
one-unit increase is well within the range of variation of the sample. In terms
of the actual number of new patents that this implies, a one-unit increase in au-
toint around its mean is equivalent to the number of new automation patents in
a commuting zone with a flat industry structure rising from 23 to 29 per year.
A particularly interesting result is how automation technology interacts with
the routine task share. In the setup with both variables in column (4), the co-
efficients on automation and on routine-intensity become insignificant. This is
likely due to the fact that the variables measure overlapping concepts, as argued
in Section 2.3. However, both coefficients are significant when we include the
interaction between the two variables. The negative coefficient on the interac-
tion shows that the magnitude of the effect of automation on employment varies
series LNS11300000, LNS11300001 and LNS11300002.) Male participation rates fell quite
monotonously from 78 percent in 1976 to 69 percent in 2014. We take care of these structural
long-run changes in the labor market not related to automation through time fixed effects.
22We will use “non-manufacturing” and “services” interchangeably, but “non-manufacturing” also
includes mining and construction.
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Table 2.7. Labor Market Eects of Automation, Five-year Overlapping Time Periods
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
autoint 0.105*** 0.222*** 0.178** 0.144 0.563**
(0.0363) (0.0783) (0.0853) (0.0886) (0.214)
non-autoint -0.120 -0.0245 0.0249 -0.0170
(0.0997) (0.0931) (0.0920) (0.0989)
manufacturing -1.782* -1.211 -1.177
(1.016) (1.082) (1.121)
population 0.0875 0.0745 0.0525
(0.114) (0.108) (0.102)
income -1.319*** -1.284*** -1.232***
(0.351) (0.347) (0.338)




autoint × routine -0.0109**
(0.00468)
Observations 24,064 24,064 24,064 24,064 24,064
R2 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43
Note: autoint and non-autoint are ve-year sums of new automation and
non-automation technology. routine is the initial percentage of routine
tasks in commuting zone employment. Includes state and year xed eects
and a constant. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
with the level of the routine task share: In commuting zones with more routine
labor, automation technology has a less positive effect. The total effect of au-
tomation in column (5) turns negative for commuting zones with a routine task
share larger or equal to 54.5 percent. The mean of routine is 34.4 and in only
0.1 percent of all observations it exceeds 54.5 percent. So, the total effect of
automation is positive in the overwhelming majority of commuting zones.
Non-automation patents are not associated with changes in employment. This
might be driven by the nature of these innovations. Many non-automation
patents are chemical or pharmaceutical and some are patents without any clear
applications. In contrast, automation patents are required by our definition to
have at least a distantly recognizable application.
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The initial manufacturing share has a mildly significant negative coefficient in
our baseline setup of column (3), which might capture the part of the secular
trend frommanufacturing to services that takes place in the five-year periods we
study. The population size is not significantly related to employment changes.
A higher per capita income negatively predicts employment changes across all
specifications. The employment level is generally higher in commuting zones
with a higher per capita income. This could be a sign of convergence in employ-
ment shares across commuting zones, but could also reflect a reversely causal
effect: as personal income is composed to a large extent of labor income, there
could be slower employment growth in commuting zones with a higher wage
level, because it is more costly to create jobs. A higher share of the non-white
population is negatively associated with employment changes.
Our findings thus paint a more positive picture of the net employment effects of
automation than Autor et al. (2015), Graetz and Michaels (2015) and Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2017), who found negative or insignificant effects of automation
on jobs.23 It is, however, in line with the findings by Gregory et al. (2016), who
show that next to a substitution effect on routine-task jobs, automation lower
the production costs. Declining goods prices boost product demand, and so new
(non-routine) jobs are created. The positive product demand effect trumps the
negative substitution effect. Both the positive level effect of automation and the
negative coefficient on the interaction term with the routine task share in our
regressions support this explanation. By using a broader measure of automation,
we can thus extend the knowledge on its employment effects beyond the findings
of a literature that focuses on specific types of automation.
2.4.5 Estimation Results: Sectoral Employment
We further study the effect of automation on different types of employment
separately. Table 2.8 shows pointedly different effects of automation technology
on manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment.
Panel A consistently shows that manufacturing employment falls when the au-
tomation intensity increases. The effect is significant in our preferred specifica-
tion (3) and when adding the routine task share in column (4). In contrast to the
total US population, the group of manufacturing workers experiences job losses
- even when controlling for the initial manufacturing share, which itself has a
significantly negative effect. The negative employment effect of automation is
more pronounced in commuting zones with a higher routine task share, as the
interaction term shows. It turns positive only for commuting zones with a rou-
tine task share below 20.9 percent. This is only the case for 115 out of 24,058
23Section 2.4.5 sheds light on why this is the case.
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Table 2.8. Labor Market Eects of Automation for Manufacturing and
Non-manufacturing Employment, Fixed Employment Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint -0.0169 -0.0480 -0.173*** -0.200*** 0.144
(0.0176) (0.0665) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0911)
non-autoint 0.0317 0.235*** 0.275*** 0.240***
(0.0747) (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0218)
manufacturing -2.581*** -2.142*** -2.127***
(0.587) (0.617) (0.656)
population -0.0335** -0.0437*** -0.0608***
(0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0149)
income -0.739*** -0.712*** -0.668***
(0.206) (0.206) (0.201)




autoint × routine -0.00898***
(0.00243)
Observations 24,058 24,058 24,058 24,058 24,058
R2 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.26
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.113*** 0.278*** 0.372*** 0.370*** 0.420***
(0.0344) (0.0984) (0.0768) (0.0799) (0.147)
non-autoint -0.169 -0.293*** -0.290*** -0.296***
(0.112) (0.0870) (0.0840) (0.0894)
manufacturing 0.852 0.883 0.887
(0.728) (0.719) (0.726)
population 0.118 0.117 0.115
(0.109) (0.103) (0.101)
income -0.612** -0.610** -0.604*
(0.291) (0.299) (0.298)




autoint × routine -0.00129
(0.00256)
Observations 24,067 24,067 24,067 24,067 24,067
R2 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Note: All regressions include state and year xed eects and a constant. Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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observations. Panel B paints a very different picture. In non-manufacturing in-
dustries, automation has a very robust job-creating effect. The coefficients are
twice as large as in Table 2.7. Non-manufacturing occupations are clear benefi-
ciaries from automation in terms of employment numbers. In contrast to Panel
A, the routine task share in the commuting zone does not play a significant role
for the size of the automation effect.
Related to this, the coefficient on the routine task share also reveals strong differ-
ences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment. Commut-
ing zones with a lot of routine labor lose more manufacturing jobs, but this is
not the case for non-manufacturing employment. This is likely due to the larger
share of routine tasks in the manufacturing than in the service sector. These find-
ings may explain why Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), in their analysis of the
impact of robot use on employment, found automation to be harmful for em-
ployment and why Graetz and Michaels (2015), using the same dataset, found
evidence for skill polarizing effects of robots: Robots are mainly used in the man-
ufacturing sector and indeed 19 out of the 24 industries covered by IRF robot
data are manufacturing industries. Other types of automation innovations, in
particular those that can be used in the non-manufacturing sector, may have a
more positive effect on employment than industrial robots. Indeed, Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2017) show that the effect of robots is less negative or even posi-
tive in non-manufacturing industries. They also find that computer usage tends
to increase the demand for labor.
We add to the existing literature by documenting different effects of automation
on manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment: Next to a polarization
in skills and tasks, automation has lead to a sectoral shift. Manufacturing sector
jobs win, while non-manufacturing jobs lose from automation.
The results presented in this and the previous section are robust to weighing
patents by how often they have been cited. Patent citations are sometimes used
as an indicator of the value of an invention and therefore, giving stronger weight
to highly cited patents might paint a more realistic picture of the degree to which
a patent is used in the production process. In Tables 2.B.6 and 2.B.7 we replicate
the regressions presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 using a citations-weighted mea-
sure of automation, which we explain further in the Appendix. While our sample
is thus shortened by several years, we still find a mildly positive effect of automa-
tion for total employment and a pronounced disparity between manufacturing
and non-manufacturing.
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2.4.6 Eects of Automation by Assignees
Patents contain information on who owns (or “is assigned") a patent. This in-
formation is valuable, because it hints on how closely a patentee’s research ac-
tivities are linked to developments in US labor markets. Innovation activity by
entities that do not have business interests in US markets is less likely to be in-
fluenced by developments on US labor markets. By focusing on new automation
technologies that are originating from such groups, we therefore get a cleaner
identification.
To classify the patents, we use data by Lai, D’Amour, Yu, Sun, Doolin, and Flem-
ing (2011), who extract the names of assignees from 1976 until 2012 and pro-
vide a host of other information about patents and their owners. We focus on
patents held by three groups of assignees, who we believe to be less directly
responsive to US labor market trends than US companies: foreigners (these can
be companies, individuals or public entities), government bodies (US or foreign)
and universities and public research institutes.2⁴
Research by foreigners can be assumed to respond to developments in their
home country rather than in the United States, as long as the following two con-
ditions are met: The company does not operate on a large scale in the United
States, and the domestic labor market trends are not linked to US trends. We do
not observe if these conditions hold, so the group of foreigners is the most en-
dogenous of the three. Universities and public research institutes conduct more
basic research than corporations, so for them, the immediate applicability or
profit maximization might only be a distant motivation. Government patents
are also unlikely to be motivated by labor market developments, but should
rather respond to military buildups, the needs of certain ministries or cycles in
budgetary planning.
Table 2.9 shows summary statistics for patents by the different groups of as-
signees. US firms are the largest group with around 1.9 million patents. The
second largest group are foreigners, who hold 1.8 million patents. Based on the
classification by Lai et al. (2011), we identify 45 thousand patents that are as-
signed to governments. The most important assignees in this category are the
US Navy with 10,922 patents, the US Army with 6,217 patents, the US Depart-
ment of Energy with 4,416 patents, the US Air Force with 3448 patents and
NASA with 2,823 patents. The largest foreign government institutions owning
US patents are French nuclear energy and aviation commissions and the British
and Canadian defense ministries. To identify patents assigned to universities, we
2⁴These groups are mostly mutually exclusive, but we count foreign governments (a small group)
in both the “foreign” and the “governments” category and foreign universities also show up in
the foreigners category.
38 | 2 Benign Eects of Automation
Table 2.9. Assignee Summary Statistics, 1976-2012
Assignee Patents Automat Share Cit. Cit. Excl. Length
(1000s) (1000s) (weighted)
US rm 1875.7 877.9 47% 12.2 1.24 14% 1012.4
foreigners 1827.8 746.3 41% 7.1 0.78 12% 831.5
universities 115.1 39.5 34% 10.4 1.03 41% 1435.9
governments 44.8 16.2 36% 8.6 0.75 17% 701
missing 609.9 169 28% 9.7 0.91 9% 653.7
Note: “Automat" are automation patents as described in text. “Cit." are the average
number of citations, “Cit. (weighted)" are the number of citations after removing time-
subclassication (HJT)means, where subgroups correspond to those of Table 2.A.2. “Excl." is
the share of excluded patents due to being pharmaceutical and chemical patents. “Length"
is the average number of lines in a patent document.
Source: Lai et al. (2011) and own calculations.
inspected the 10,000 assignees with the most patents and determined whether
they are an university or a public research institute. There are 581 such entities
holding a total of 115 thousand patents. The most productive are the University
of California (5,400 patents), the Industrial Research Institute of Taiwan (4,289
patents), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (3897 patents), the Elec-
tronics and Telecommunications Research Institute from South Korea (3,606
patents) and the French Institute of Petroleum (2,471 patents). For the remain-
ing 610 thousand patents, we do not know the assignee, as this information is
missing in Lai et al. (2011). A casual inspection of these patents suggests that
most of these also belong to US firms or individuals.
The automation patents assigned to foreigners, universities or governments may
be of a different nature than those held by US firms – not just for their less di-
rect link to economic developments in the United States, but for reasons related
to their applicability. We might see different effects of automation on employ-
ment if they were not representative of the technology frontier in automation.
Table 2.9 shows that patents held by US firms are characterized by a larger share
of automation patents and are more widely cited than those held by other paten-
tees. However, automation patents are highly correlated across groups at the
industry level, as Table 2.10 shows. Automation innovations by governmental,
foreign and university patentees seem to be applicable in similar industries as
automation innovations patented by US firms or individuals. This is not the case
when considering all patents. So while it is reasonable to assume that patented
automation technology is similar across assignee groups, this is not the case for
technology in general.
Indeed, the types of patented innovations differ across technology subgroups. As
Table 2.A.2 shows, US firms hold a particularly high share of “Communication
2.4 Labor Market Eects of Automation Technology | 39
Table 2.10. SIC-level Correlation of Patents in Assignee Subcategories with US
Companies
Assignee Patents Automation
year year & SIC year year & SIC
foreigners 0.33 0.33 0.94 0.95
universities 0.35 0.36 0.88 0.88
governments -0.45 -0.43 0.02 0.04
Note: Shows correlations of subcategories with the cate-
gories of US rms and missing assignees. “year" indicates
that year trends are taken out, “year & SIC" indicates that
year and industry trends are taken out.
& Computer" patents, which contain a large number of automation patents. For-
eigners hold fewer pharmaceutical patents, but many mechanical patents and
their patents are cited least often. The column “Cit. (weighted)" in Table 2.9
shows that this holds even after controlling for time and subgroup fixed ef-
fects. Universities hold many chemical and pharmaceutical patents and few in
the “Communication & Computer" category. These patents are also particularly
lengthy. In contrast, governments hold many patents on electric and electronic
innovations, and the corresponding patent texts are shorter than those from
other assignees.
We replicate our empirical analysis from the previous section in two ways. First,
we repeat the panel data regressions of Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, but for autoint
and non-autoint we use the intensities computed from either only university
patents, foreign patents or government patents. Second, we use all three au-
tomation sub-indicators as instrumental variables for possibly more endogenous
category of US companies and non-identified assignees. The purpose of this ex-
ercise is to extract only the component of automation that is unrelated to US
labor market developments. As we only have assignee data until 2012, we limit
our analysis to the period 1976 to 2012.
For university patents, we document positive net effects of automation on em-
ployment. The same holds when using all three groups of automation patents
as instruments in column (4). It is striking that again none of the effects of au-
tomation on total employment is negative. The size of the coefficient in Table 2.7
lies in the middle of the new estimates. Table 2.12 reports separate results for
manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment. We find negative effects
of automation on manufacturing employment for all assignee groups apart from
university patents. All types of patented automation technology lead a rise in
non-manufacturing employment. The magnitude of the coefficients again frame
the previous estimates. The findings strongly support the results from our base-
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Table 2.11. Labor Market Eects of Automation, Various Assignee Groups
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
university foreign gov’t IV
autoint 0.410* 0.153 -0.108 0.128*
(0.217) (0.128) (0.223) (0.0717)
non-autoint -0.332 0.0145 0.379 0.0344
(0.238) (0.144) (0.252) (0.0756)
manufacturing -0.769 -2.017 -2.061* -1.961***
(1.217) (1.203) (1.058) (0.377)
population 0.121 0.110 0.113 0.119***
(0.114) (0.112) (0.116) (0.0232)
income -1.225*** -1.393*** -1.358*** -1.358***
(0.342) (0.369) (0.370) (0.192)
non-white -1.277*** -1.256*** -1.301*** -1.255***
(0.233) (0.256) (0.250) (0.255)
Observations 22,648 22,648 22,648 22,648
R2 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42
Note: All columns replicate column (3) of Table 2.7. In columns (1)
- (3), the full automation measure is replaced by automation by
universities, foreigners and governments, respectively. The non-
automation measure is constructed accordingly. The last column
represents an IV regression, where university, foreign and govern-
ment (automation) patents are used as instruments for the re-
maining (automation) patents. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
line analysis and thus show that the earlier findings were likely not biased by
endogeneity of the regressors.
While having roughly the same effects on employment, we can detect slight
differences between the patent assignee categories. Automation technology
patented by universities and public research institutes has the most strongly pos-
itive effects on employment and even the manufacturing sector does not lose
from this type of technology. The negative employment effects of automation
on the manufacturing sector are strongest when we consider only government
patents. Why could this be the case? Universities hold many chemical and phar-
maceutical patents, while governments patent many electrical and mechanical
patents (Table 2.A.2). But as explained before, we exclude most chemical and
pharmaceutical patents and the classification algorithm further extracts only a
relevant subset of patents. As Table 2.A.3 shows, the makeup of the final au-
2.4 Labor Market Eects of Automation Technology | 41
tomation patents does not differ much between those two groups of assignees.
Pharmaceutical patents make for 4 percent of university automation patents and
1 percent of government university patent. A more likely explanation is that the
innovations by universities and governments differ along other dimensions that
we do not measure.
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Table 2.12. Labor Market Eects of Automation for Manufacturing and
Non-manufacturing Employment, Various Assignee Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
university foreign gov’t IV
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint -0.120 -0.208*** -0.435*** -0.216***
(0.114) (0.0314) (0.128) (0.0329)
non-autoint 0.157 0.286*** 0.518*** 0.303***
(0.145) (0.0375) (0.169) (0.0331)
manufacturing -1.796** -2.827*** -2.441*** -2.807***
(0.672) (0.652) (0.693) (0.171)
population -0.0399*** -0.0429*** -0.0419*** -0.0321***
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0140) (0.00941)
income -0.807*** -0.793*** -0.862*** -0.724***
(0.213) (0.234) (0.213) (0.0746)
non-white -0.287 -0.130 -0.310 -0.0937
(0.264) (0.257) (0.270) (0.125)
Observations 22,642 22,642 22,642 22,642
R2 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.518*** 0.380*** 0.354*** 0.374***
(0.170) (0.112) (0.125) (0.0598)
non-autoint -0.479** -0.304** -0.175 -0.314***
(0.204) (0.135) (0.148) (0.0637)
manufacturing 0.912 0.897 0.337 0.963***
(0.849) (0.842) (0.605) (0.310)
population 0.157 0.150 0.150 0.147***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.110) (0.0200)
income -0.431 -0.611* -0.506 -0.661***
(0.304) (0.311) (0.314) (0.167)
non-white -0.989*** -1.143*** -0.978*** -1.188***
(0.138) (0.131) (0.146) (0.207)
Observations 22,650 22,650 22,650 22,650
R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Note: All columns replicate column (3) of Table 2.8. In columns (1) - (3),
the full automation measure is replaced by automation by universi-
ties, foreigners and governments, respectively. The non-automation
measure is constructed accordingly. The last column represents an IV
regression, where university, foreign and government (automation)
patents are jointly used as instruments for the remaining (automa-
tion) patents. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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2.5 Reassessing the Literature
With our new dataset we revisit findings from two important papers of the litera-
ture on the local labor market effects of automation. We investigate whether our
measure of automation predicts different effects for the growth of non-college
service sector jobs (Autor and Dorn (2013)) and how the effects of automation
compare with those from China import competition (Autor et al. (2015)).2⁵
Apart from gaining additional insights through our new indicator, this allows
comparing our results to the findings from the literature using the established
routine-share measure.
2.5.1 Revisiting Autor and Dorn (2013): The Non-college Service Sector
and Employment Polarization
Autor and Dorn (2013) address the issue why there has been an increasing polar-
ization in both employment and wages in 1980-2005. They focus on non-college
service sector jobs (e.g., cleaners or security guards), which have grown more
rapidly than other less-educated and low-paying occupations (such as factory
work) and which have experienced wage increases. The authors hypothesize
that this is due, among other things, to an increase in automation technology:
Automation has reduced the demand for routine manual tasks, while increasing
the demand for non-routine manual tasks, thus benefiting non-college service
sector jobs at the expense of non-college production jobs.
In their empirical analysis, Autor and Dorn (2013) use the routine-task share as
a proxy for automation and show that in commuting zones where initially more
people worked in routine occupations, there was a larger increase in non-college
service employment. In Table 2.A.4, column (1), we reproduce their finding to
the letter.
We then add autoint, our new automation intensity measure. The interaction
term in column (4) between autoint and routine is positive and significant: Non-
college service jobs rise in commuting zones with a high routine-task share ini-
tially and where many new automation patents could be used. This is consistent
with the model presented by Autor and Dorn (2013) and highlights an impor-
tant piece of evidence: the presence of those routine jobs that can be easily
automated is necessary for the shift of low-skilled employment into the service
sector, not the availability of automation technology by itself.
2⁵Data and replication files for both papers are from David Dorn’s website, ddorn.net/data (ac-
cessed 10.02.2017).
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However, the total effect of automation changes from negative to positive only
at a routine-task share of 0.38, a number reached by just 2 out of 2,166 obser-
vations and the coefficient on autoint in columns (2) and (3) is insignificant. So
although we found in Section 2.4.5 that automation creates non-manufacturing
jobs, the rise in non-college service jobs depends crucially on the mix between
automation and the existence of routine jobs.
2.5.2 Revisiting Autor, Dorn and Hansen (2015): Employment Eects
and Relation to Exposure to Chinese Trade Competition
Since the 1990’s, there has been a strong rise in trade between the United States
and China. A number of papers, such as Autor et al. (2013), Acemoglu et al.
(2016) and Pierce and Schott (2016), argue that Chinese import competition is
responsible for employment losses in those regions where firms reside that are
most exposed to it. Autor et al. (2015) investigate whether this “China shock"
or automation has a larger impact on U.S. labor markets. They find that while
import competition reduces employment in local labor markets, automation –
as measured by the routine task share – is not related to employment changes.
We revisit this finding with our dataset. Table 2.A.5 replicates the baseline
analysis of Autor et al. (2015), Table 1, in which the authors regress 10-year
equivalent changes in the employment-to-population ratio, unemployment-to-
population ratio and non-participation rate among working age adults. The two
main variables of interest are the contemporaneous change in Chinese import
exposure per worker and the start-of-decade employment share in routine occu-
pations, both of which are being instrumented.2⁶
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 2.A.5 are exact replications of columns (1) and (3)
of Autor et al. (2015), one containing only the initial routine share, the other one
both the routine share and the China shock as explanatory variables. In columns
(2) and (5), we replace the routine share by our commuting zone automation
intensity. While the coefficient on the routine share is always insignificant, our
automation measure has a significantly positive effect on the employment share
and a significantly negative effects on both share of unemployedworkers and the
share of workers that are not in the labor force. This even holds when including
both autoint and the routine task share. Automation patents have positive effects
2⁶The instrument for the trade variable is imports from China to other advanced economies. For
the initial routine task share, Autor et al. (2015) use its 1950 value in all states but the one that
contains the commuting zone, weighted by 1950 employment shares. They argue that in this way,
they can isolate the stable, long-run differences in the production structure across commuting
zones.
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by reducing the unemployment rate and the number of people outside of the
labor force, with a larger effect on the latter group.
An additional finding is that while the effect of the routine task share stays
insignificant when including the China shock in column (5), the estimates be-
come even more strongly positive when using our automation indicator. The
coefficient on the China shock change little when using autoint (column (5))
instead of the routine (column (4)). This lends further support to the findings
of Autor et al. (2015) on the detrimental effect of Chinese import competition,
while automation is playing a more positive role now.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions: First, it provides a new indicator of automa-
tion by applying a text classification algorithm to the universe of U.S. patents
granted since 1976. Linking patents to their industry of use and, ultimately, to
commuting zones, we construct geographical intensities of newly available au-
tomation technology. The second contribution is a fresh assessment of the la-
bor market effects of automation. In an econometric analysis, we show that in
commuting zones where more newly-invented automation technology becomes
available, the employment-to-population ratio increases. At the same time, there
is a shift from routine manufacturing jobs towards non-routine service sector
jobs. These results hold when we study only patents by universities, govern-
ments or foreigners, which are likely less responsive to developments in US labor
markets than domestic firms.
While rising employment ratios in response to automation technology are good
news, the benefits of automation may be unevenly distributed. We hope that
future research will provide more insights in this respect. A more general contri-
bution of this paper is that it pioneers a way of extracting trends in innovation
which can also be used to study the effects of other technologies on the economy.
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Table 2.A.1. Yearly automation and non-automation patents
#A #P #A #P #A #P
1976 16279 70194 (25%) 1989 27928 95565 (35%) 2002 77267 167400 (54%)
1977 15433 65215 (26%) 1990 25925 90421 (34%) 2003 82017 169077 (56%)
1978 15412 66087 (26%) 1991 28037 96561 (35%) 2004 84372 164384 (58%)
1979 11721 48840 (28%) 1992 29165 97472 (36%) 2005 69602 143891 (54%)
1980 14937 61815 (28%) 1993 30439 98385 (38%) 2006 91201 173822 (59%)
1981 15885 65770 (28%) 1994 33699 101695 (39%) 2007 83196 157331 (60%)
1982 15092 57877 (31%) 1995 35135 101431 (41%) 2008 86705 157788 (62%)
1983 14546 56863 (31%) 1996 40411 109654 (44%) 2009 92843 167463 (62%)
1984 17665 67212 (31%) 1997 40217 112019 (44%) 2010 121163 219835 (62%)
1985 19415 71668 (32%) 1998 57293 147577 (46%) 2011 126328 224871 (63%)
1986 19515 70867 (32%) 1999 58464 153591 (45%) 2012 147550 253633 (65%)
1987 24359 82963 (34%) 2000 61273 157595 (45%) 2013 163112 278507 (66%)
1988 22006 77938 (33%) 2001 64796 166158 (46%) 2014 178422 301643 (67%)
total 2158825 4971078 (43%)
Note: #A: number of automation patents as classied by own algorithm; the patent totals #P are reported as
counted by us in the patent les. The USPTO reports slightly dierent numbers for total patent counts on its
website, but the dierence is below 0.5% in all years.
Source: USPTO, Google and own calculations.
Table 2.A.2. Assignee’s Patents Across Technological Categories, 1976-2012
Assignee Patents Chem- Comm., Drugs, Electr., Mech- Oth-
(1000s) ical Comput. Med. Electron. anical ers
US rm 1875.7 17% 25% 11% 16% 13% 18%
foreigners 1827.8 16% 23% 7% 20% 18% 16%
universities 115.1 23% 13% 31% 17% 6% 9%
governments 44.8 21% 15% 11% 21% 14% 18%
missing 609.9 11% 8% 11% 9% 21% 39%
Note: Technological classications are based on USPC numbers and aggregated using the
scheme by Hall et al. (2001).
Source: Lai et al. (2011), Hall et al. (2001) and own calculations.
50 | 2 Benign Eects of Automation
Table 2.A.3. Share of Automation Patents After Excluding Patents
Assignee Patents Chem- Comm., Drugs, Electr., Mech- Oth-
(1000s) ical Comput. Med. Electron. anical ers
US rm 1875.7 2% 24% 2% 8% 5% 6%
foreigners 1827.8 1% 20% 1% 7% 7% 4%
universities 115.1 2% 12% 4% 10% 2% 4%
governments 44.8 2% 11% 1% 11% 4% 7%
missing 609.9 1% 7% 2% 4% 6% 8%
Note: Technological classications are based on USPC numbers and aggregated using the
scheme by Hall et al. (2001). This table excludes all patents based on the selected pharma-
ceutical and chemical industries as explained in text.
Source: Lai et al. (2011), Hall et al. (2001) and own calculations.
Table 2.A.4. Automation and Non-college Service Employment, 1980-2005
Outcome: 10 × annual change in share of non-college
employment in service occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
routine 0.105*** 0.105*** -0.336
(0.0320) (0.0284) (0.230)
autoint -0.00100 -0.000990 -0.00533**
(0.000688) (0.000645) (0.00227)
routine × autoint 0.0139*
(0.00695)
Constant -0.00632 0.0568*** 0.0241 0.161**
(0.0104) (0.0210) (0.0202) (0.0740)
R2 0.179 0.171 0.185 0.188
Note: 2,166 observations (3 time periods × 722 commuting zones); robust
standard errors in parentheses; all models include state xed-eects
and period xed eects and are weighted by start of period commuting
zone share of national population.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Own calculations following Autor and Dorn (2013), Table 5.
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Table 2.A.5. Labor Market Eects of Automation Patents, Routine Employment Share
and Exposure to Chinese Import Competition, 1990-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Share of employed in workage population
routine -0.0481 -0.0369 -0.207 -0.185
(0.224) (0.233) (0.254) (0.260)
autoint 0.215*** 0.206*** 0.331*** 0.297***
(0.0670) (0.0748) (0.0757) (0.0792)
∆ (Imports from China -0.831*** -0.832*** -0.942***
to US)/Worker (0.215) (0.181) (0.221)
B. Outcome: Share of unemployed in workage population
routine -0.0144 -0.0247 -0.00513 -0.0104
(0.0616) (0.0653) (0.0702) (0.0728)
autoint -0.0579** -0.0645** -0.0926*** -0.0914***
(0.0255) (0.0282) (0.0222) (0.0285)
∆ (Imports from China 0.186*** 0.249*** 0.221***
to US)/Worker (0.0527) (0.0676) (0.0612)
C. Outcome: Share of not in labor force in workage population
routine 0.0624 0.0616 0.213 0.195
(0.172) (0.178) (0.194) (0.197)
autoint -0.158*** -0.141** -0.239*** -0.206***
(0.0538) (0.0608) (0.0667) (0.0672)
∆ (Imports from China 0.645*** 0.583*** 0.721***
to US)/Worker (0.188) (0.155) (0.190)
Note: The table is based on Autor et al. (2015), Table 1, juxtaposing the eect of Chinese import
competition and routine biased technological change on 10-year equivalent changes in the em-
ployment status of the working-age population. N = 1444 (2 time periods 1990-2000, 2000-2007,
722 commuting zones). All regressions control for the start of period levels of share of employ-
ment in manufacturing, share of population that is college educated, share of population that is
foreign born, employment rate among females and Census division dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of period commuting
zone share of national population. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Appendix 2.B Further Robustness Checks
2.B.1 Patent Citations
Not all patents are of the same importance. Scherer and Harhoff (2000) show
that the returns on innovation are highly concentrated, with the 10 percent
most valuable patents accounting for around 80 percent of realized value. While
Griliches (1990) argues that using a large number of patents partly addresses
this concern, we can count how often a patent was cited by other patents as an
indicator of its value. We use the patent citations files by Lai et al. (2011) until
2009. The number of citations per patents follow a well-known hump-shape, as
newer patents are cited less frequently, but the propensity to cite has risen. Also,
some industries (such as pharmaceutical and chemical patents) cite many more
patents than others (such as electronics). To control for this, we demean cita-
tions across years and the broad technology classes defined by Hall et al. (2001).
This is the “fixed effect” method proposed by Hall et al. (2001).
We then weight patents by how often they were cited and replicate our analysis.
The analysis shows similar results: Manufacturing employment falls and service
employment rises when more (citation-weighted) automation patents become
available. The baseline effect on all employment becomes insignificant in this
specification, but the interaction between automation and routine task share is
still significant.
2.B.2 Non-overlapping Five-year Periods
As an alternative to the five-year overlapping regressions presented in the main
part of the paper, we show regression results for non-overlapping periods. These
are 1977-1981, 1982-1986, 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2006,
2007-2011 and 2012-2014, for which we compute five-year equivalents for the
last period that covers only three years. The panel therefore comprises 8 time
periods and 708 commuting zones. The results are similar to those presented
in the main text. The coefficients in Table 2.B.8 are slightly larger and more
significant than those presented in Table 2.7. The effects of automation for the
two employment groups of Table 2.B.9 are also each slightly more positive than
those of Table 2.8, but the finding of the contrary effect of automation is strongly
supported.
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Table 2.B.6. Labor Market Eects of Automation of Citations-weighted Patents
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
autoint 0.0896** 0.177* 0.0337 -0.0226 0.456**
(0.0339) (0.0990) (0.0748) (0.0834) (0.212)
non-autoint -0.0917 0.104 0.182* 0.106
(0.124) (0.0885) (0.0949) (0.107)
manufacturing -2.391** -1.458 -1.264
(0.887) (1.080) (1.171)
population 0.192** 0.171** 0.146*
(0.0846) (0.0800) (0.0771)
income -1.337*** -1.285*** -1.222***
(0.389) (0.380) (0.378)




autoint × routine -0.0117**
(0.00424)
Observations 20,524 20,524 20,524 20,524 20,524
R2 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34
Note: Uses citation-weighted patents. Uses only observations until 2009. Ci-
tations are adjusted with the Hall et al. (2001) xed eect method. Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.B.7. Labor Market Eects of Citations-weighted Automation Patents for
Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint -0.0198 -0.110 -0.262*** -0.292*** 0.0443
(0.0186) (0.0762) (0.0373) (0.0425) (0.136)
non-autoint 0.0948 0.332*** 0.375*** 0.323***
(0.0884) (0.0418) (0.0490) (0.0488)
manufacturing -2.880*** -2.374*** -2.237***
(0.536) (0.590) (0.613)
population -0.0310** -0.0425*** -0.0595***
(0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0169)
income -0.792*** -0.765*** -0.721***
(0.169) (0.162) (0.169)




autoint × routine -0.00826**
(0.00320)
Observations 20,520 20,520 20,520 20,520 20,520
R2 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.26
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.103*** 0.295*** 0.315*** 0.297*** 0.405**
(0.0313) (0.0722) (0.0615) (0.0705) (0.157)
non-autoint -0.202** -0.258*** -0.233*** -0.250***
(0.0832) (0.0741) (0.0799) (0.0882)
manufacturing 0.519 0.818 0.861
(0.673) (0.776) (0.829)
population 0.218** 0.211** 0.205**
(0.0832) (0.0782) (0.0757)
income -0.580* -0.563 -0.549
(0.332) (0.334) (0.336)




autoint × routine -0.00263
(0.00296)
Observations 20,529 20,529 20,529 20,529 20,529
R2 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28
Note: Automation and non-automation are citations-weighted. Only uses ob-
servations until 2009. Citations are adjusted with the Hall et al. (2001) xed
eect method. All regressions include state and year xed eects and a con-
stant. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table 2.B.8. Labor Market Eects of Automation, Five-year Non-overlapping Time
Periods
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
autoint 0.154*** 0.324*** 0.258** 0.246* 0.611***
(0.0334) (0.0892) (0.126) (0.134) (0.162)
non-autoint -0.173** -0.0776 -0.0610 -0.0825
(0.0740) (0.125) (0.137) (0.133)
manufacturing -1.191* -1.031* -0.886
(0.616) (0.601) (0.595)
population 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.0908***
(0.0256) (0.0236) (0.0241)
income -0.644*** -0.627*** -0.601***
(0.228) (0.224) (0.223)






Observations 5,663 5,663 5,663 5,663 5,663
R2 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41
Note: The table presents xed eects panel data regressions using non-
overlapping ve-year equivalent changes in employment as percent of com-
muting zone population as the dependent variable. autoint and non-autoint
are ve-year sums of new automation technology and non-automation tech-
nology, as dened in the text. routine is the initial percentage of routine tasks
in commuting zone employment. Further controls are the initial manufactur-
ing employment share, the log of the initial commuting zone employment,
the log of initial per capita income and the initial share of non-white citi-
zens in the population. All regressions include state and year xed eects
and a constant. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.B.9. Labor Market Eects of Automation for Manufacturing and
Non-manufacturing Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.00382 -0.0365* -0.110*** -0.137*** 0.255***
(0.0102) (0.0216) (0.0269) (0.0297) (0.0653)
non-autoint 0.0409** 0.164*** 0.205*** 0.179***
(0.0187) (0.0285) (0.0328) (0.0390)
manufacturing -1.588*** -1.209*** -1.055***
(0.222) (0.223) (0.231)
population -0.00100 -0.0118 -0.0239*
(0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0125)
income -0.710*** -0.666*** -0.645***
(0.139) (0.143) (0.140)






Observations 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660
R2 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.137*** 0.363*** 0.368*** 0.382*** 0.260
(0.0317) (0.0778) (0.113) (0.124) (0.160)
non-autoint -0.230*** -0.253** -0.274** -0.267**
(0.0612) (0.104) (0.121) (0.123)
manufacturing 0.321 0.115 0.0700
(0.425) (0.419) (0.424)






income 0.0393 0.0176 0.0101
(0.172) (0.178) (0.176)
non-white -1.032*** -1.013*** -0.992***
(0.229) (0.219) (0.219)
Observations 5,662 5,662 5,662 5,662 5,662
R2 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37
Note: Uses non-overlapping ve-year equivalent changes. All regressions in-
clude state and year xed eects and a constant. Standard errors clustered
at the state level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
3Patterns of Panic:
Financial Crisis Language in
Historical Newspapers
3.1 Introduction
To analyze the causes and consequences of financial crises, we need to know
when they occured. But while the 1873, 1907 or 1929 financial crises are well-
documented, many smaller banking panics and liquidity crunches in the 19th
and 20th century are less well known and difficult to classify from traditional
sources. For many questions which we would like to explore, it is more relevant
what people at the time thought was happening on financial markets rather than
what we perceive with hindsight.
Newspaper archives are a rich source of narrative history that can help us un-
derstand and quantify our recent financial history. This paper uses 35 million
titles of five major U.S. newspapers since 1889 which can be used to measure
financial sentiment. The new dataset complements existing indicators of finan-
cial stress, such as “narrative” accounts (Bordo and Meissner, 2016; Laeven and
Valencia, 2012; Schularick and Taylor, 2012), the interplay of financial variables
(Baron et al., 2018; von Hagen and Ho, 2007; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012) or
the behavior of credit aggregates (Rancière et al., 2008). Long-run historical
text archives offer a new path to measure beliefs and opinions about financial
markets.
Text has long been used as quantitative data in macroeconomics and finance.
Niederhoffer (1971) and Cutler et al. (1989) investigate the intersection of
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news stories and financial markets, but these early attempts were limited in the
scope of textual data they could handle. Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Tet-
lock (2007) use better algorithms and faster computers to explore much larger
text corpora. However, the time coverage of these studies is short. Instead, this
project offers a novel both long-run and high-frequency measure of financial
stress. To construct this new dataset, I analyze the universe of published news-
paper titles by five major US newspapers (Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los
Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post) from when they were
first published. Combining these newspapers provides a rich temporal, spatial,
political and topical coverage of newspaper language.
The new indicator has several desirable properties. It is based on a number of
newspapers to smooth out particularities of individual media outlets which re-
duces noise in the final indicator. It is based on text archives and does not use
web search masks which limit what other papers in this literature could do. The
uninterrupted publication of newspapers mean that such a series can be gener-
ated throughout the World Wars, periods when other macroeconomic variables
are unreliable or difficult to obtain. Newspaper reporting is available on a daily
basis, a high frequency that is rare for historical macroeconomic and even finan-
cial series. They also cover weekends and bank holidays and so they offer a deep
and high-frequent historical coverage even when financial markets were closed.
And whereas previous indicators were often binary, I provide a continuous indi-
cator.
Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) and Baker et al. (2016) follow a similar route,
but they search for “economic policy uncertainty” which is a different, more
abstract and more vague idea and so arguably harder to identify in text docu-
ments. The financial market is a more precise concept which makes it easier to
find set of keywords to describe it. Also, newspapers write regularly and reli-
ably about financial markets, so it is a plausible concept to monitor over time.
A similar argument applies to Caldara and Iacoviello (2016) who create an in-
dicator of geopolitical risk from newspaper article counts. Manela and Moreira
(2015) and García (2013) use newspaper language as a measure of financial
stress, but both are limited to one newspaper. O’Connor et al. (2010) show that
sentiment measured on tweets correlates strongly with consumer sentiment and
Bollen et al. (2011) provide evidence that moods on Twitter predict stock mar-
ket performance. Jalil (2015) also builds on historical newspapers to create a
new narrative indicator for financial panics for the United States before 1929.
I proceed in three steps. First, I describe the new dataset and explain how to
measure financial sentiment. I select all articles that are concernedwith financial
markets using a broad dictionary of 120 words and show results are robust to
altering this dictionary. I study the emotional content of newspaper titles by
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counting words with positive and negative connotations based on four sentiment
lexicons including a total of 11,407words with positive or negative connotations.
In this way, I construct a new daily measurement of how financial markets were
covered from 1889 to 2016. I create four different indicators, one for each of
the sentiment lexicons. Surprisingly, all four series strongly comove, a result that
is not driven by overlap between the dictionaries. To create the main financial
stress indicator, I normalize the individual newspaper series and average across
them. Results are unchanged when using alternative ways to create the indicator
through removing newspaper-specific trends or eliminating newspapers from
the sample.
Second, I validate the indicator using a third-party data source by the profes-
sional media analysis company Media Tenor AG. Trained experts read and la-
beled 23,000 articles in the Wall Street Journal. A comparison of these articles
with the new indicator shows that my approach reliably identifies days with
strong coverage of negative financial market reporting. This dataset covers only
a subset of years and newspapers, but its large size and high level of detail allow
for an in-depth comparison with the new indicator.
Third, I analyze what happened in the US economy during and after times
of increased negative financial sentiment. Local projections in quarterly and
monthly frequencies provide estimates of how other macroeconomic variables
behave after an increase in financial stress. Spikes in my indicator are followed
by lower economic activity, rising unemployment, lower stock market returns
and increases in corporate bond spreads.
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3.2 Data
The dataset contains the titles of all newspaper articles of five U.S. American
newspapers which are the Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times,Wall
Street Journal and Washington Post. All five newspapers were founded in the
19th century and have been published continuously since. Table 3.1 shows the
first dates of publication for these newspapers, which range from 1853 for the
Chicago Tribune to 1889 for the Wall Street Journal.
Table 3.1. Summary of Newspaper Data
Name Since Titles Financial Titles Words Unique
(total) titles (/ day) words
Chicago Tribune 1853 9.0m 4.0% 154 36m 380k
Boston Globe 1872 6.7m 3.5% 129 26m 370k
Washington Post 1877 7.7m 4.3% 153 31m 340k
Los Angeles Times 1881 7.9m 4.8% 164 40m 315k
Wall Street Journal 1889 3.9m 19.5% 107 18m 170k
I only keep articles, editorial articles and front matter. This excludes adverts,
obituaries or the weather, as these are unlikely to be of relevance to the analysis
in this paper. Also, I only have access to the titles of newspaper articles. Titles are
written to capture the gist of an article and - most of the time - convey a strong
sense of what articles are about. Given the very extensive and comprehensive
nature of this dataset, it is therefore likely that I capture trends in reporting
well.
These five newspapers have commonly been used in the literature, such as by
Baker et al. (2016) and Caldara and Iacoviello (2016). They cover different
regions, have other political alignments and emphasize different topics in their
reporting. A typical number of articles for a newspaper is about 30,000 to 60,000
per year and between 100 and 200 per day. Figure 3.1 shows how the number
of titles per newspaper changed over the years. Trends are quite distinct for
each newspaper which is to be expected as the number of titles will vary with
stylistic choices, the size of the readership, a newspaper’s commercial success,
business strategy and changes in the media landscape such as the shift to online
publishing. While the Wall Street Journal contained about 30,000 articles per
year, the Chicago Tribune published about 60,000 articles per year. The number
of articles in the Los Angeles Times grew steadily until the early 1990s and has
declined since. For newspaper language to become interpretable, it is therefore
necessary to normalize article counts by newspaper length.
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Figure 3.1. Number of Titles per Newspaper
While theWall Street Journal has the lowest total number of titles and the lowest
number of titles per day, the ratio of hard news (politics, economics) to soft news
(sport, crime) is higher for this newspaper. In the next section, I will explain
how I classify financial titles. About a fifth of titles in the Wall Street Journal
are concerned with financial markets, while this percentage is only between 3.5
and 4.8 percent for the other newspapers. The total number of written words
(also called tokens) per newspaper is between 18 and 40 million and the size
of the total dictionary of unique words that these newspapers used is between
170 and 380 thousand.
Newspaper titles have become longer over time. Figure 3.A.1 plots the average
number of words per title. The average length of titles doubled, from about four
words to about nine words per title. Newspapers further provide a dense news
coverage throughout the week. The five newspapers are published on all days of
the week, with the exception of the Wall Street Journal which does not appear
on Sundays. It is thus another attraction of highly-frequent newspaper data that
it is possible to construct indicators covering all days of the week, even when
stock markets are closed.
3.3 Measuring Financial Sentiment
In the previous section I described the newspaper data and explained the struc-
ture of the data. I now turn to measuring financial sentiment in the titles. This
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involves two steps: I first find out what is being reported and then I measure
how it is reported.
3.3.1 Sentiment Dictionaries
The main benefit of having the full corpus of titles at hand – as opposed to
searching for keywords through online databases – is that it allows to search
for much larger lists of words.2 These compilations are called “dictionaries” or
“lexicons” and have the purpose of providing an easy way to measure emotional
content in texts. The dictionaries are compiled by a mix of computational lin-
guists and economists and rate unigrams (individual words) as being of positive
or negative connotation.
I use of four sentiment dictionaries which are provided by different researchers
and have subtly different purposes. The NRC (National Research Council
Canada) dictionary by S. Mohammad and P. Turney (2010) and S. M. Moham-
mad and P. D. Turney (2013) is not specific to any domain but is meant to
be quite general. The bing lexicon by Hu and Liu (2004) and Liu et al. (2005)
serves primarily to evaluate customer reviews. Notowidigdo (2011) constructs
the AFINN (Affective Norms for English Words) with the purpose of measuring
language on microblogs and tweets. The dictionary by Loughran and McDonald
(2011) is the one most tailored to measuring emotional connotations in busi-
ness reports, press briefings and has also been previously applied to the financial
press (e.g. by García, 2013). Only AFINN assigns scores from -5 to +5 to words
and the other three dictionaries sort words into simple “positive” and “negative”
categories.
While the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary may be the one most suit-
able for the purpose of this paper, there are good reasons to measure sentiment
with different dictionaries. It serves as a strong robustness check to test if the
constructed series are similar and I combine the results from the four dictionar-
ies to create one baseline indicator. Of the total of 11,407 unique words that are
contained in one of the four dictionaries, 8,229 only show up in one of them.
2,633 words belong to two dictionaries, 542 are contained in three dictionaries
and only three words (“abundance”, “confess” and “unexpected”) show up in
all four. As Table 3.2 shows, between 28% and 61% of words are unique to any
2Baker et al. (2016) and Caldara and Iacoviello (2016) search for short lists of words through web-
based masks which limits the number of phrases one can include. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)
search for a large number of words and phrases, but do this only for one year of newspaper data.
Tetlock (2007) analyzes one column in theWall Street Journal from 1984 to 1999 with dictionary
methods. Manela and Moreira (2015) similarly examines titles and first paragraphs of the same
newspaper using a machine learning model.
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Table 3.2. Lexicon Statistics
nrc bing loughran AFINN
positive
Words 2312 2006 354 878
Unique 61% 51% 33% 34%
Cos. sim. with loughran 0.12 0.23 1 0.21
negative
Words 3324 4782 2355 1597
Unique 39% 51% 49% 28%
Cos. sim. with loughran 0.22 0.25 1 0.24
Note: For AFINN, assigns words to “negative” and “positive” de-
pending on score sign. “Unique" refers to the share of articles
that only show up in this one lexicon. The respective third
rows report cosine similarity with the Loughran and McDonald
(2011) dictionary.
of these dictionaries, so they may capture different moods. Table 3.2 also dis-
plays the number of positive and negative words in the dictionaries. The “bing”
dictionary is particularly sizable, while the “loughran” dictionary contains few
positive words.
Another way to compare documents is through their cosine similarity. Cosine
similarity is an established indicator of comovement in high-dimensional spaces
and is the non-centered normal (Pearson’s) correlation coefficient and ranges
from 0 to 1 for positive count data. As Table 3.2 shows, the nrc, bing and AFINN
dictionary have low similarities with the the loughran dictionary. The loughran
might be different from the others dictionaries due to its specific purpose of
measuring financial sentiment, but the small overlap also shows the value of
using different dictionaries for this analysis.
Simply applying these dictionaries to newspaper titles produces misleading
trends. Large sections of contemporary newspapers cover topics such as sport,
cooking or health. The topic “crime” is particularly prevalent in newspapers.
Consider the words: “dead”, “death”, “dies”, “fight”, “fire”, “killed”, “police” and
“shot”. These are classified by at least one dictionary as negative and are related
to violent crime. The eight terms show up in 3.5% of titles in the Boston Globe,
5.5% of titles in the Chicago Tribune, 4.0% of titles in the LA Times, 0.7% of titles
in the Wall Street Journal and 4.0% of titles in the Washington Post. This shows
the importance of first selecting only those article titles that are concerned with
financial markets.
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3.3.2 Finding Articles about Financial Markets
I select beforehand a range of words about financial markets. It is one of the ad-
vantages of searching for a precise concept such as reporting about the financial
market that picking words to describe it is relatively easy.
I liberally assemble a large list of 120 words and phrases that signal that a title
is about economics, financial markets or business more generally. I base these
on words from several content areas (or topics) and usually add their singular
and plural forms and some alternative word forms and combinations. Here are
some examples of the words in these topics:3
• bonds: “bonds”, “credit”, “debt”, “loan”, “mortgage”
• business: “commerce”, “entrepreneur”, “industry”, “profits”
• central banks: “boj”, “bernanke”, “bundesbank”, “central bank”,“currency”,
“dollar”, “draghi”, “ecb”, “fed”, “franc”, “money supply”, “reichsbank”,
“‘volcker”, “yellen”, “yen”
• economy: “consumers”, “economy”, “production”, “purchases”
• general: “banks”, “financial markets”, “fund”, “interest rates”, “losses”,
“wall street”
• gold, silver: “bullion”, “coin”, “gold", “silver”
• inflation: “consumer prices”, “cpi”, “deflated”, “inflation”, “producer
prices”
• railroads: “railroad”
• stocks: “capital markets”, “dividends”, “equities”, “stocks”
• trade: “embargo”, “exports”, “imports”, “tariff”
• trouble: “bail out”, “credit crunch”, “market declines”, “stress test”
Table 3.3 shows the number of words per topic, the total number of titles that
contain a word from this topic and the total share of financial articles that is
due to a topic. The topic “general” is the most important one and accounts for
almost a fourth of financial articles.
3The full list is in Appendix Section 3.B.
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Table 3.3. Importance of Topics
Topic Words Titles Share
general 30 501k 23%
bonds 8 398k 18%
stocks 7 336k 15%
business 9 240k 11%
economy 12 216k 10%
central banks 24 201k 9.8%
gold, silver 5 142k 6.4%
trade 10 92k 4.2%
railroads 1 58k 2.6%
ination 8 25k 1.1%
trouble 8 7k 0.3%
total 122 2200k 100%
Figure 3.2 plots the occurence of these topics over time. Differences between
the topics are not completely sharp. The topics “economy” and “business” tend
to move together, for example. Other topics are related concepts, such as “cen-
tral banks” and “inflation”. In general, however, these topics cover most relevant
areas of financial markets and capture articles that we would normally consider
to be concerned with a broad notion of finance. Railroad companies and their
earnings and dividends were an important asset class before WWI (Homer and
Sylla, 2005) and the financial press of those times reflects that. Price movements
in gold and silver were more central to financial markets and the global mone-
tary system, but these monetary commodities have – since the end of the Bretton
Woods system in the 1970s – lost in importance. Instead, reporting about the
actions of central banks has become more prevalent since the 1980s. Trade and
in particular the term “tariffs” also used to hold greater prominence in financial
reporting.⁴
The point of searching for this large list of words is to be very inclusive in which
articles to count as finance. But choosing these words by hand raises the question
of whether the new indicator is sensitive to exactly which words are included.
This is not the case, as the occurence of financial terms in titles is highly skewed.
Counting all titles that contain at least one of the words in Section 3.B returns
about 2.2 million titles. Only ten words account for 41 percent of these finan-
cial articles. These words are: “stock(s)”, “bond(s)”, “fund(s)”, “loss”, “gold”,
⁴Baker et al. (2016) also include “tariffs” in their group of words to measure historical economic
policy uncertainty.
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trade trouble
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Note: Figure shows averages across the ve newspapers. Values are shares
of titles containing a word from a specic topic.
Figure 3.2. Financial Topics in Newspapers
Table 3.4. Changing Financial Dictionary
Number of words 10 20 50
Share nance titles 41% 62% 92%
Correlations with baseline 0.81-0.95 0.90-0.98 >0.99
Note: Shows what happens when restricting the size of the
dictionary used to classify titles as being about nancial ar-
ticles to the x most frequent words. See text.
“profit”, “industry". Adding the next 10 most important words (“loan”, “banks”,
“railroad”, “financial”, “silver”, “finance”, “economy”, “investors”, “credit” and
“dividend”) raises this percentage to 62 percent. I also repeat all steps to con-
struct the baseline indicator (of negative financial sentiment) and compare the
resulting quarterly time series. The second row in Table 3.4 shows the range of
resulting correlations when using the four different sentiment dictionaries. The
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Figure 3.3. Articles about Financial Markets
Note: Financial articles as share of all articles.
series constructed from the dictionary using only 10 words has the smallest cor-
relation of 0.81 (for the nrc dictionary). Correlations are very high throughout
and the two indicators are indiscernible using the 50 most frequent financial
terms.
This means that picking a larger and more inclusive dictionary is unlikely to
change results much, but this approach catches some articles that we would
plausibly consider to be about financial markets. The term “reichsmark”, for
example, only shows up in 11 titles, but such titles are nonetheless a good can-
didate to be concerned with finance.
Figure 3.3 plots the share of articles about financial markets by newspaper. The
data start when a newspaper was founded, which is why there are about forty
years more data for the Chicago Tribune than for theWall Street Journal. A much
larger share of articles (about 20 percent) in the Wall Street Journal is about
financial markets than in the four other newspapers (where this share is about
7 percent). The Los Angeles Times started reporting more on financial markets in
the 1990s. The Boston Globe has the lowest overall share of reporting on financial
markets of about 5 percent.
Reporting on financial markets increased during the Great Depression, the 2001
dotcom bubble and, especially for theWall Street Journal, during the heat of the
financial crisis 2008. The earlier series aremore volatile. Thismight be due to the
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shorter titles which also make finding a good financial language dictionary more
difficult. This also shows that the indicator becomes most trustworthy when I
start averaging sentiment values across all five newspapers in 1889.
3.3.3 Measuring Emotional Content of Articles
After identifying which articles are concerned with financial markets, the next
goal is to measure the tone of those titles. Sometimes, measuring sentiment from
newspaper titles is easy. Take for example the following title in the Wall Street
Journal on February 10th 2017:
“Equities: Tax-Cut Talk Lifts Stocks"
This would likely be considered good news for financial markets. Consider an-
other article from the Wall Street Journal, this one from March 3rd 1938:
“Sugar Market Declines Following Publication Of [the Secretary
of Agriculture Henry A. ] Wallace’s Views"
This title conveys the news that the price of sugar is falling and might be con-
sidered to have neutral or negative tone. One could theoretically carry out such
a classification by hand and measure the tone in articles. But to do such an
analysis at scale, I use of the previously-described sentiment dictionaries.
I count the number of negative and positive words for every article on financial
markets and sort articles into “positive”, “negative” and “neutral” financial lan-
guage depending on their net sentiment score. For example, if a title contains
two negative and one positive words, I count it as negative.⁵ Figure 3.4 shows
the share of newspaper articles that are both about financial markets and have
net negative sentiment. For all newspapers, the four series are strongly corre-
lated with all pairwise correlations between 0.44 and 0.96 (mean: 0.83, median:
0.87).⁶ Correlations are higher for the Wall Street Journal than for the Boston
Globe which might be caused by the much higher share of financial reporting in
the former newspaper. Each series was constructed using a different sentiment
dictionary and their strong comovement is a powerful robustness check for this
method and a further sign of the plausibility of measuring financial stress using
newspapers. The previous section also showed that overlap between the dictio-
naries is low, so the correlation does not arise mechanically.
⁵The AFINN dictionary uses numericals scores per word, so there I calculate a net sentiment score
and then count titles as positive or negative.
⁶See Table 3.A.1.
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Figure 3.4. Negative Financial Articles
Note: Calculated as all newspaper articles that are both about nancial markets and
have net negative sentiment divided by all articles in that quarter.
For the final new indicator, I normalize values to mean 100 and unit standard
deviation and average across newspapers and sentiment dictionary series. Al-
ternatively, one could weigh newspapers by their circulation numbers (such as
Doms and Morin, 2004) or by some other measure of importance or reliability,
but this is not feasible due to the long time span of the data considered in this
paper. The Wall Street Journal is first published in 1889, so from this point on-
wards we can be most confident about the quality of the new financial sentiment
indicator.
Figure 3.5 plots this key new indicator. Spikes occur around known episodes of
financial stress, such as the panics of 1893, the land boom and crash in Florida
in 1926, the crash of 1929, the spring of 1933, Black Monday in 1987, the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997, the stock market crash and recession of 2001 onwards,
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2011 and “shutdown" of the US govern-
ment in 2015. The indicator takes its highest value during the fall of 2008 when
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and the US and global financial systems were
on the verge of collapse. It stayed highly elevated in spring 2009.
Trends in neutral and positive articles about financial markets are also insightful.
Figure 3.A.2 shows the share of neutral and positive financial titles across news-
papers and Figure 3.A.3 shows the normalized mean across newspapers. Neutral
reporting rose initially and then peaked during WWI and the Great Depression
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Figure 3.5. New Financial Stress Indicator
Note: Calculated as normalized share all newspaper articles that are both about nancial
markets and have net negative sentiment divided by all articles in that quarter. Figure shows
averages across the ve newspapers and across sentiment dictionaries. Gray bars mark the
world wars.
and has trended downwards since. Positive financial reporting was high during
the 1920s, the late 1990s and the 2000s before the financial crisis. This may
be a sign of the “exuberant” years on financial markets, when the economy was
booming and stock prices were rising.
The period between the end of WW2 and the starting financial globalization in
the 1970s was a period of calm on financial markets. Strong financial regulations
and tight capital controls led to low levels of credit and leverage (Jordà et al.,
2016) and almost an elimination of financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
Newspapers mirror these calm financial conditions. All newspapers in the sam-
ple – apart from the Wall Street Journal – talked less about financial markets in
general (Figure 3.4). And when they reported on finance, they wrote to simi-
lar degrees as before in neutral and positive terms (Figure 3.A.3), but used less
negative language (Figure 3.5).
It is surprising how much negative financial reporting has fallen since the finan-
cial crisis of 2008. After the last strong spike in 2011, the indicator has had an
average value of 100, about the level of the 1970s or late 1930s.
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(b) Eliminating individual newspapers from sample
Figure 3.6. Alternative Indicators
Note: Shows indicator from Figure 3.5, constructed in some alternative ways by de-
trending or by eliminating one newspaper from the sample. Gray bars mark the
world wars.
3.3.4 Alternative Indicators
As Figure 3.4 shows, there are long-run trends in reporting that are idiosyncratic
to individual newspapers. Those could be driven by editorial policies or style
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changes. It is therefore a worry that the new indicator in Figure 3.5 might be
dominated by these long-run trends but that the more relevant variation lies in
the short run spikes around the trend.
I therefore also construct three alternative indicators that detrend the series
in Figure 3.4 on the level of the individual newspapers. The first detrending
uses a third-order polynomial regression in time of the form, fst = β0 + β1 t +
β2 t
2 + β3 t3 + "t , where fst is the financial sentiment indicator in quarter t.
The detrended new indicator then becomes the residual "t . The second detrend-
ing method is a very slow-moving Hodrick-Prescott filter with a λ parameter of
5× 106 (5× 107 for the monthly indicator). Third, I apply the detrending pro-
cedure proposed by Hamilton (2017) using a cycle length of 10 years. This last
method uses the first 10 years of data to estimate the trend which truncates the
beginning of the indicator by a decade.
An additional concern is that the very distinct movements in the newspaper se-
ries in Figure 3.4 might mean that some newspapers drive the final indicator
much more than others. I therefore exclude one newspaper at a time and and
create separate indicators from the remaining four newspapers.
Figure 3.6 visualizes these alternative indicator series. Neither taking out
newspaper-specific trends nor eliminating individual newspapers from the sam-
ple alters the indicator much. The shape of the indicator is thus robust to alter-
native ways of creating it. Table 3.A.2 shows that correlations of the detrended
indicators are above 0.72 for the quarterly and above 0.63 for the monthly base-
line indicator. After taking out one of the newspapers, indicators still have great
resemblance with the version using all newspapers and all correlations are above
0.96 for the quarterly and the monthly data. As expected, correlations with
the baseline fall slightly when changing both detrending and eliminating some
newspapers at the same time: The lowest correlation coefficient is attained when
taking out an HP trend and dropping the Chicago Tribune from the sample which
reduces the correlation to 0.59 for quarterly and 0.55 for monthly values.
I conclude that changes to the construction of the indicator do not affect it much.
This is a further sign that the procedure picks up the underlying signal well and
is not an artifact of arbitrary choices made in its construction.
3.4 Testing the New Indicator
After constructing the new financial sentiment dataset this section validates the
new dataset with a large sample of manually coded newspaper articles and com-
pares the new indicator to established measures of financial stress.
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3.4.1 Comparison with Manually Coded Articles
The private media analysis company Media Tenor provides 23,316 manually
coded articles from 2007-2016 from the Wall Street Journal. Expert human
coders read whole newspaper articles and label articles according to a structured
set of questions. The main purpose of this dataset is to measure the description
of economic conditions in the United States and other countries. The coders
also classify the topic of articles, e.g., “financial markets", “politics" or “labor
markets". The dataset also indicates the tone of the article (good, neutral, bad)
and whether the article is concerned with the past, present or future. Table 3.5
shows some statistics about this dataset. The data is split in three samples with
about 7,000 to 8,000 articles in each. The earliest article is from January 2007
and the last from August 2016. Unfortunately, the dataset does not cover the
height of the financial crisis starting in October 2008, as the first sample stops
in June 2008 and the second only begins in July 2012. Most reporting is about
the present (83%) which is a useful validation of the approach taken in this
paper and in the literature. A negative tone prevails in economics and finance
reporting with a negative tone in 44% of articles and a positive tone in only 15%
of articles. An extensive literature reports that negative incidents are more likely
to be reported.⁷
The largest topic is “business cycles” and the most relevant category “financial
market” makes up only 8 percent of articles. The lack of coverage of sports,
health, culture, entertainment and crime and the low volume of reporting on
politics shows that Media Tenor selected only articles that were related to eco-
nomics and business, broadly defined. This should not be an issue for the com-
parison I carry out here, as these are precisely the topics that my method using
sentiment dictionaries is also trying to capture. While I cannot use the Media
Tenor data to analyze trends in overall reporting on the economy and on busi-
ness, I can use it to measure the distribution of more detailed topics within
economics and business reporting.
Ideally, I would match the Media Tenor data with my data on the newspaper ar-
ticle level. I could then compare whether mine and Media Tenor’s classifications
agree for every article. However, I do not have unified identifiers (such as article
IDs) or newspaper titles (in the Media Tenor sample). I can, however, compare
the time trends from the new indicator series with those I calculate from the
Media Tenor data. I therefore define the number of articles in the Media Tenor
sample that are of a specific topic and have a negative connotation, which is
analogous to how I constructed the indicator.
⁷See Gieber (1955), Combs and Slovic (1979), Bohle (1986), eisensee2007news and Miller and
Albert (2015).
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Table 3.5. Summary of Wall Street Journal Coded Sample
Articles Share
Period
Jan 2007–Jun 2008 7897 33%
Jul 2012–May 2013 7106 30%












business cycle 8637 37%
economic growth 3538 15%
economic policy 2630 11%
nancial markets 2376 8%
monetary policy 1866 8%
scal policy 1735 7%
labor market 1116 5%






politics/news (page 2-) 5157 22%
politics/news (page 1) 3031 13%
nance/markets 1075 5%
other (13 more) 936 4%
total 23316 100%
I use a regression to investigate the comovement of these two series:
mt = γw + δp + β ft + "t . (3.1)
Here, mt are the Media Tenor topic trends on day t, β is the regression coeffi-
cient of interest and ft is my new indicator series (share of financial articles in
theWall Street Journal with a negative sentiment). "t is the error term. Newspa-
per languagemay vary depending on the day of the week, as weekdays might see
more news or the publishing of statistics on special days might drive both mar-
kets and reporting. I therefore include a dummy indicating the day of the week
γw. The three samples cover quite different time periods and trends in reporting
and the economic situation might show a correlation where there are just joint
trends for other reasons. Equation (3.1) therefore also includes a dummy for
the three samples δp.
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Figure 3.7. Comparison with Media Tenor Sample
Note: Compares themeasurement of titles in theWall Street Journal described in text with
sample of manually classied articles by Media Tenor. Figure shows the coecient of a
regression of the number of articles with negative connotation per day on the number of
negative titles about nancial markets identied by one of four sentiment dictionaries.
The regression also includes dummies for the day of the week and for the three samples.
Table 3.A.3 contains the values.
I estimate this regression model for all Media Tenor topics and using the four
indicator series constructed from the different sentiment dictionaries. Figure 3.7
visualizes the regression coefficients and confidence bands (and values are in Ta-
ble 3.A.3). The topic “financial markets” with a negative tone occurs more often
on precisely those days when my derived indicator series of negative financial
language is larger. For the bing sentiment dictionary, the coefficient is only sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level. The topic “business cycle” also appears more
often on those days that see a high indicator value, but the coefficient is less
precisely estimated. The topic “economic policy” is positively associated with
the indicator only for the AFINN dictionary. The bing dictionary stands out in
that “global economies” (a topic about worldwide economic trends and foreign
economic developments) shows significant comovement.
Overall, this is encouraging. On days where the new indicator was greater, hu-
man experts also considermore articles to report negatively on financial markets.
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Figure 3.8. Comparing Monthly Financial Stress Measures
Note: Lighter colors signal earlier dates. Monthly data comparing the new indicator
to the historical US Economic Policy Uncertainty indicator from Baker et al. (2016),
the credit spread index from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), the risk spread (Fred
codes BAA and GS10) and the VIX. The areas surrounding the linear regression line
show the 95% condence bands.
The high quality third-party data source and great level of detail in this dataset
allows for a very thorough comparison with my dataset. However, a limitation of
this validation exercise is that that it only works with articles from one newspa-
pers and near the end of my sample. We should thus be careful not to infer too
much about the reliability with regards to other newspapers and earlier years.
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3.4.2 Comparison with Previous Financial Stress Indicators
There are several other indicators that are commonly used to measure finan-
cial stress. Figure 3.8 plots the monthly share of articles with negative financial
language against four other variables that are indicative of different facets of
financial stress. The long time span and high frequency of the new newspaper-
based dataset makes comparisons with these other series particularly fruitful. I
find strong positive correlations (between 0.59 and 0.74) in all cases.
The “Economic Policy Uncertainty” (EPU) indicator by Baker et al. (2016) shows
a firm positive correlation with the new indicator. The colors in the figures are
lighter for earlier dates which cluster farther down the figure. This is a sign
that the association between the two variables was flatter in the earlier years.
A reason might be that the EPU is more volatile even at the start of the joint
sample since 1900.
A number of episodes stand out. Both measures take extreme values during the
fall of 2008 which was the height of the financial crisis. The two variables also
jump in late 2001, when the 9/11 attacks led to a political crisis and losses
on financial markets. The new financial stress indicator took a high value in
October 1929, but the EPU remained low. The EPU reacts more strongly to wars,
such as the beginning and end of WWI.
The other three panels of Figure 3.8 show how the new indicator relates to three
other common indicators of financial stress. My indicator jumps earlier than the
other series. The indicator reached a new all-time-high already in September
2008. The other series stay elevated for a longer period and remain at high
levels into the spring of 2009. This might mirror the nature of media reporting,
as facts are reported when they are new.
3.5 Financial Sentiment and the Economy
This section compares the new financial stress measure to events taking place in
the economy at the same time. To analyze how the new financial crisis indicator
comoves with variables in the aggregate economy, I use local projections – a type
of multivariate time series regression. This approach has also been followed by
other papers creating new newspaper indices, such as Baker et al. (2016) and
Caldara and Iacoviello (2016).
Indicators created from newspaper language are not exogenous to developments
in the economy. Instead they measure the media’s response to what was happen-
ing in the economy and on financial markets. Nevertheless, providing concise
summaries of the joint comovement of new indicators and economic variables is
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insightful. It is likely that newspapers reported more negatively on the economy
during and after times of increased financial stress. This does not answer the
question of what led to the increase in financial stress or what the economic
fallout of an increase in the cost of financial intermediation is. It, however, fur-
ther validates the new indicator series and allows for a comparison with other
financial stress measures.
For this, I estimate local projections as introduced by Jordà (2005). Local pro-
jections have become a common tool, as they allow easier modeling of non-
linearities, are more robust to misspecified models and can be easily carried
out using single-equation estimations. They do not, however, allow to specify
cross-equation restrictions which are useful when using vector autoregressions.
But given that this is not what I do in this paper, local projections are the right
modeling choice.
I present both a quarterly and a monthly analysis, which differ in the periods
they cover and in the variables they include.
3.5.1 Quarterly Local Projections
Using quarterly data allows to use data for real GDP and the unemployment
rate constructed by Ramey and Zubairy (2017). These authors provide quarterly
economic data starting in 1890.
I fit the following regression to the data:










δk,i zt–i + "k,t . (3.2)
This is a time series regression that predicts the change in the dependent vari-
able yt+k – yt–1 for k = 0,1,2, ...K periods ahead. The constant αk is allowed
to differ for every prediction interval and "k,t is the error term. In the quarterly
set-up, I use (the log of) real GDP and the unemployment rate as dependent
variables. The central independent variable is ft , the new financial sentiment
variable developed in this paper (depicted in Figure 3.5). The main parameter
of interest is βk which measures the response of the dependent variable after an
increase in ft .
I also include i = 1, . . . , I lags of the dependent variables. This will be 4 lags in
the quarterly version and 12 lags in the monthly version to account for possi-
ble cyclical variations over the year. Apart from lagged values of the dependent
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Figure 3.9. Quarterly Local Projections, 1890-2015
Note: Quarterly data. Shows estimates from local projections after a one standard devi-
ation increase in nancial stress.
variable (yt) and financial sentiment ( ft), I also include the respective other
dependent variable as zt . When yt is real GDP growth, zt is the unemployment
rate (and vice versa). These variables have the purpose of controlling for the
state of the business cycle. I then report how a one unit change in the indicators
reverberates through the system.
Figure 3.9 shows the impulse response functions. An increase in the new indi-
cator means that more negative language is used, so it is indicative of a rise
in financial stress. Real GDP falls slightly, but the response is not precisely esti-
mated. The unemployment rate rises by about three percentage points.
I also estimate the quarterly models for three subperiods: The period of the
classical gold standard before 1913, the interwar period from 1919 to 1939 and
for the post-war period from 1946 to 2016. I show the impulse responses from
these separate estimations in Figure 3.10. The much reduced sample size makes
finding significant results more difficult. The markers in Figure 3.10 are filled if
a coefficient is estimated to be different from zero at the 5% significance level.
For GDP, results are again imprecise. In the post-war episode, there is a negative
response in the first two months. Unemployment rises in the interwar and the
post-war period after an increase in the new indicator. This effect is precisely
estimated in the post-war period for about 9 months after the jump in financial
stress. The response in the interwar period is more pronounced which is likely
due to the importance of the Great Depression in the 1930s. The response of
unemployment under the gold standard is not significant. This hints at the dif-
ferent functioning of labor markets before 1913. Labor markets were less rigid
before WWI (Feinstein et al., 2008), so if wages adjusted faster this might ex-
plain the muted response of unemployment.


















Figure 3.10. Quarterly Local Projections by Time Period, 1890-2015
Note: Quarterly data. Shows estimates from local projections after a one standard devia-
tion increase in nancial stress. Uses the loughran dictionary for the nancial sentiment
variable. Markers are lled if estimates are dierent from zero at the 5% signicance
level.
3.5.2 Monthly Local Projections
The monthly estimation uses industrial production as the measure of economic
activity and I include the growth rate of the S&P stock market indicator. I also
use corporate bond spreads, calculated as the difference in the yield on AAA
and BAA rated corporate bonds. This is a standard measure of financial stress
which is indicative of the time-varying availability ability of the financial market
to provide capital to more risky firms. Last, this model version also includes the
consumer price index (CPI) to measure inflation.⁸ Using monthly data holds the
benefit of more than doubling the number of observations from 504 to 1165, but
it also truncates the beginning of the sample from 1890 to 1919.
⁸Fred codes: INDPRO, AAA, BAA and CPIAUCNS. Stock market data is from Shiller (2000) (irra-
tionalexuberance.com).
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Figure 3.11. Monthly Local Projections, 1919-2016
Note: Monthly data. Shows estimates from local projections after a one standard devia-
tion increase in nancial stress.
Figure 3.11 displays the impulse response functions of a one standard deviation
shock in financial stress. Industrial production decreases initially and remains
subdued for about two years. Stock markets fall, an effect that stays significant
for several years after impact. Corporate bond spreads jump markedly. This is a
sign that the new financial stress indicator indeed captures periods of financial
stress well. Inflation does not respond unambiguously.
interwar period
post-war period
Corporate bond spreads Inflation
Industrial production Stock market performance























Figure 3.12. Monthly Local Projections by Time Period, 1919-2016
Note: Monthly data. Shows estimates from local projections after a one standard devia-
tion increase in nancial stress.
82 | 3 Patterns of Panic
I estimate separate models for the interwar period up to 1945 and the post-
war period starting 1946. Industrial production again falls significantly and this
effect is larger in the interwar period. Stock market growth is lower in both
time periods. Corporate bond spreads also rise for both samples, but in the post-
war period there is a reversal after about two years. When estimating models
for these separate time periods, the response of the inflation rate also becomes
significant. There is a slight fall in inflation after the war, but a strong fall by
about seven percentage points in the first time period. This is likely due to the
deflation experience of the early 1930s.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
In Section 3.3.4, I discuss alternative ways to create the new financial stress
indicator. Using these series in the local projections does not change the overall
conclusions.
Figure 3.A.4 (a) shows the impulse responses obtained from quarterly local pro-
jections when using detrended indicator series instead. The impulse responses
from all three detrending methods are very similar to those from the baseline
indicator. Real GDP falls as in the baseline, but this effect is only significant
for the Hamilton (2017) detrending. Unemployment rises significantly across
all specifications with estimates that are slightly lower than those of the base-
line indicator. Figure 3.A.5 (a) similarly shows how monthly impulse responses
change when using detrended indicator series. Most detrended series yield sim-
ilar results to the non-detrended baseline indicator. Only the estimates from the
HP filtered indicator have a slighty different trajectory. The reversal of the stock
market returns for the HP filtered indicator after 50 months is not significant at
the 95 percent level.
Figure 3.A.4 (b) plots impulse responses from the quarterly model when taking
out individual newspapers. Results are again very similar. Effects are somewhat
less pronounced when removing the Chicago Tribune and are larger when leav-
ing out the Boston Globe for real GDP and the Washington Post for unemploy-
ment. As before, all estimates are insignificant for real GDP and all are effects
are significant for unemployment.As Figure 3.A.5 (b) shows, the monthly im-
pulse responses are not affected much when excluding newspapers. While all
estimates are nearby, they show some divergence for industrial production and
inflation when eliminating the Boston Globe from the sample.
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3.6 Conclusion
Newspapers have been called “the first draft of history".⁹ When looking back at
more than a century of financial history, we can learn a lot from reading that first
draft again. Events that were salient to observers at the time might be glanced
over in the historical narratives. This real-time and subjective view of financial
markets serves as an important complement to our usual data sources.
This paper takes the universe of published newspaper titles of five major US
newspapers since the 19th century and provides a novel indicator of financial
stress. I identify newspaper titles concerned with financial markets and measure
their emotional connotation. From this, I construct a new indicator of negative
financial sentiment. A sample of 23,000 hand-coded articles from a media anal-
ysis company allows to evaluate the performance of the indicator and I show
that the new indicator captures reporting on financial markets well.
I apply the new financial stress indicator in an analysis using local projections to
analyze its comovement with key economic variables. I exploit the fact that the
new measure is available both on a high frequency and for a long time span and
estimate both a quarterly version since 1890 and a monthly version since 1919.
I find that an increase in negative financial sentiment is followed by a fall in
output, higher unemployment, lower stock market returns and rising corporate
bond spreads. This is robust to estimating models using data from different time
frequencies, time periods, controlling for several other macroeconomic variables
and alternative ways of constructing the new indicator.
The new dataset offers a range of other applications to researchers, as newspaper
articles can also be interpreted as the signals that agents received. The literature
studying the impact of economic life-time experiences – such as Malmendier and
Nagel (2011) – could benefit from employing this new data, as people might not
respond to historical measurements of economic variables, but rather to how
the situation was perceived at the time. This paper also points to the various
other research avenues still open for macroeconomists. Questions of relevance
tomacroeconomists that could be addressedwith newspaper data aremeasuring
inflation expectations or the degree to which government spending shocks were
anticipated.
⁹Popik (2009) traces the origin of the quote.
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Figure 3.A.1. Length of Newspaper Titles
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Figure 3.A.2. Other Moods in Newspaper Articles
Note: Calculated as all newspaper articles that are both about nancial markets and
have net neutral/positive sentiment divided by all articles in that quarter.
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positive
neutral








Figure 3.A.3. Other Moods in Financial Sentiment
Note: Financial articles with neutral or net positive sentiments as share of all articles.
Shows normalized averages across the ve newspapers.
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Real GDP Unemployment



















Detrending method:  3rd-order polynomial Hamilton (2017) Hodrick-Prescott filter none
(a) Dierent detrending methods
Real GDP Unemployment




















without Los Angeles Times
without Wall Street Journal
without Washington Post
(b) Leaving out newspapers from sample
Figure 3.A.4. Quarterly Local Projections with Alternative Indicators, 1890-2015
Note: Shows estimates from quarterly local projections after a one standard devia-
tion increase in nancial stress.
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Detrending method:  3rd-order polynomial Hamilton (2017) Hodrick-Prescott filter none
(a) Dierent detrending methods
Corporate bond spreads Inflation
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without Los Angeles Times
without Wall Street Journal
without Washington Post
(b) Leaving out newspapers from sample
Figure 3.A.5. Monthly Local Projections with Alternative Indicators, 1919-2016
Note: Shows estimates from quarterly local projections after a one standard devia-
tion increase in nancial stress by time periods.
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Table 3.A.1. Pairwise Correlations of Lexicon Indices
Lexicon AFINN bing loughran nrc
Boston Globe
AFINN 1.0 0.78 0.60 0.44




AFINN 1.0 0.89 0.94 0.74




AFINN 1.0 0.96 0.95 0.93




AFINN 1.0 0.96 0.96 0.87




AFINN 1.0 0.84 0.92 0.71
bing 1.0 0.77 0.81
loughran 1.0 0.64
nrc 1.0
Note: Shows the pairwise correlations be-
tween the time series of the share of negative
nancial titles by dictionary in Figure 3.4.
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Table 3.A.2. Correlations Across Alternative Indicators
baseline polynomial HP lter Hamilton (2017)
Quarterly
all newspapers 1.00 0.75 0.72 0.82
no Boston Globe 0.98 0.74 0.71 0.80
no Chicago Tribune 0.96 0.60 0.59 0.79
no Los Angeles Times 0.97 0.83 0.80 0.87
no Wall Street Journal 0.98 0.84 0.81 0.88
no Washington Post 0.98 0.72 0.70 0.75
Monthly
all newspapers 1.00 0.76 0.63 0.82
no Boston Globe 0.98 0.75 0.63 0.81
no Chicago Tribune 0.96 0.63 0.55 0.79
no Los Angeles Times 0.97 0.84 0.71 0.88
no Wall Street Journal 0.98 0.85 0.71 0.88
no Washington Post 0.98 0.73 0.61 0.76
Note: Shows correlations when constructing alternative indicators (detrending
and/or leaving out individual newspapers from sample). The “baseline" does not
detrend and uses all newspapers. Uses quarterly/monthly variables 1889-2016
(detrended indicator for Hamilton 2017 method starts in 1900).
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Table 3.A.3. OLS Estimates of Media Tenor Comparison
Lexicon
Topic AFINN bing loughran nrc
business cycle 0.182 0.211 ∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗ 0.212 ∗
(0.115) (0.106) (0.109) (0.115)
nancial markets 0.115∗∗∗ 0.066 ∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.04)
economic policy 0.091∗∗∗ 0.033 0.029 0.062 ∗
(0.033) (0.03) (0.031) (0.033)
global economies 0.062 0.186 ∗∗ 0.049 -0.036
(0.087) (0.081) (0.087) (0.081)
scal policy 0.083 -0.008 0.125 0.131
(0.111) (0.1) (0.106) (0.11)
commodities 0.004 0.037 0.018 -0.002
(0.04) (0.04) (0.038) (0.044)
business 0.088 0.05 -0.04 0.018
(0.078) (0.067) (0.088) (0.066)
monetary policy 0.028 0.003 0.026 0.054 ∗
(0.031) (0.029) (0.03) (0.032)
other 0.104 0.071 0.109 0.009
(0.072) (0.074) (0.084) (0.085)
politics -0.054 -0.052 -0.061 -0.101
(0.077) (0.068) (0.072) (0.079)
labor market 0.036 0.014 0.006 -0.014
(0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
economic growth -0.058 0.05 0.049 -0.094
(0.125) (0.11) (0.119) (0.121)
Note: Shows OLS estimates and standard errors from a regression
of the number of articles from a specic topic on the share of neg-
ative nancial language, as measured by dierent lexicons. Also
controls for day of the week and sample dummies. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Shows corresponding estimates to Figure 3.7.
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Appendix 3.B Dictionaries
This section includes the dictionaries I use to filter articles of specific topics. I
convert all text to lowercase before the matching, so “fed" would match “fed",
“Fed", “FED" or any other capitalization.
The following dictionary serves the purpose of selecting articles that are con-
cerned with financial markets:
bail out, bailout, banks, bernanke, boj, bond, bonds, bretton woods, broker, broker-
age, brokerages, bullion, bundesbank, capital markets, central bank, central banks, coin,
coinage, commerce, commercial, consumer, consumer confidence, consumer price, con-
sumer prices, consumers, cpi, credit, credit crunch, credit crunchs, currency, dax, debt,
debts, deflated, deflation, derivative, derivatives, dividend, dividends, dollar, dollars,
draghi, ecb, economic, economies, economy, embargo, embargoes, entrepreneur, en-
trepreneurial, entrepreneurs, equities, equity, export, exported, exports, fed, federal
reserve, finance, financial, financial markets, financial system, franc, fund, funds, gold,
government bond, government bonds, greenspan, import, imported, imports, income,
incomes, industrial, industry, inflated, inflation, interest rate, interest rates, investor,
investors, loan, loans, loss, losses, market declines, markets decline, monetary, money
market, money supply, mortgage, price movement, price movements, produce, producer
prices, producers, profit, profits, purchase, purchases, railroad, reichsbank, reichsmark,
silver, sterling, stock, stocks, stress test, stress tests, swap, swaps, tariff, tariffs, treasury




Joint with Carsten Detken, Anna Kalbhenn and Eric Persson
4.1 Introduction
Private debt booms hold risks for the economy. Excessive credit growth has been
shown to precede recessions, financial crises and to lower returns to bank capital
and bonds.2 However, the question remains why people accumulate so much
debt in the first place. If individuals rationally decide howmuch to consume and
save, why do we observe these ups and downs in credit and economic activity?
Understanding the causes of debt booms is essential for providing policy makers
with good advice and the right tools to mitigate their effects. Households might
rationally take on debt due to higher anticipated earnings or lower interest rates
and an increase in debt might therefore not call for a market intervention. But if
savings decisions are based on unreasonable income expectations and this could
somehow be found out in advance, then there might be room for policy action.
We ask whether errors in income expectations are a plausible explanation for
credit accumulation. For this, we propose a new measure of errors in aggregate
income expectations. Some studies — e.g. De Stefani (2017) and Rozsypal and
2See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Greenwood and Hanson
(2013), Alessi and Detken (2017), Chen and Rancière (2016), Baron and Xiong (2017), Lopez-
Salido et al. (2017) and Mian et al. (2017a).
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Schlafmann (2017) — use consumer surveys for measuring income expecta-
tions, but such data is only available for few countries. However, credit cycles
are slow-moving and financial crises are rare events, so data with sufficient in-
ternational coverage is necessary to allow making statements with enough sta-
tistical power. Good international data coverage also helps eliminate country
idiosyncrasies and to find macroeconomic regularities that hold more generally.
This paper uses a collection of professional forecasts by the private data provider
Consensus Economic Forecasts (CEF). The CEF sends a survey every month to fi-
nancial firms, banks and economic research institutes and asks them to predict
macroeconomic variables.
We obtain quarterly GDP forecasts and calculate forecast errors as the differ-
ence between mean predictions and realizations. Taking forecasts as proxies
for expectations in the economy, we examine what happens with household
debt accumulation in periods of overly optimistic expectations. The resulting
quarterly dataset covers 32 countries accounting for 79 percent of global out-
put over almost three decades. Our analysis shows that positive forecast errors
in 12 month ahead real GDP growth are contemporaneously correlated with
booms in household debt growth. This association holds across time periods,
within industrialized and developing countries, controlling for time and coun-
try fixed effects, excluding banking crises and when controlling for the state of
countries’ business cycles and ex ante real interest rates. Household debt reacts
strongly, but there is no relevant comovement of expectation errors with firm
debt growth. This evidence is in line with Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017a) who
show that higher household debt predicts negative GDP forecast errors. We turn
their analysis around and ask what drives debt accumulation. Also, we use a
different data source which allows us to use quarterly, not annual, observations.
After establishing our baseline result, we provide additional evidence from an-
other dataset. We use the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters in which fore-
casters provide subjective confidence bands. On the downside, this dataset only
covers the euro area. We show unambiguously that panelists suffer from over-
precision in their forecasts. The 95 percent confidence intervals that panelists
provide are so narrow that they cover only a third of subsequent realizations.
We take this as a further support for our approach of using forecast errors as
proxies for expectation errors.
We then dive into how panelists update their forecasts when they receive new
information. We use a method from Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) and
Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2018) to show strong evidence for over-
reaction by forecasters, a finding that is robust across countries and two levels
of observation. In particular in the run-up to the financial crisis up to 2006 ex-
pectation formation showed strong signs of overreaction.
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This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to provide comprehensive empirical
evidence that misaligned income expectations are a plausible explanation for
credit growth across the world. This is relevant for economic policy as it pro-
vides further support to the recent efforts to monitor — and maybe regulate —
lending to households.
4.2 Theories of Credit Booms
Since the financial markets turmoil of 2007 onwards, economists’ interest in un-
derstanding the causes and consequences of financial crises has been rekindled.
A robust empirical finding is that private credit tends to rise before trouble hits
financial markets and the economy. The literature offers several explanations
for debt booms and these theories make predictions on how forecast errors and
credit cycles should be related in the data.
Cochrane (2017) surveys the field of macrofinance and lays out the unifying
framework of a cyclical bias in the representative agent’s consumption-savings
decision. This wedge leads to a comovement of economic and financial activity in
the economy. These biases take different forms, such as neglecting small prob-
ability events, extrapolative expectations or habits. But the effects from these
distortions tend to be alike: Lenders overestimate the present value of current
and future incomes tempting them to hold more debt than they can stomach,
while savers overestimate the capacity of households or firms to repay debts.
Whether it is the providers or the receivers of credit who change their behavior
is of relevance to how we expect prices to adapt. If banks become more will-
ing to lend, then we would expect interest rates to drop. Mian et al. (2017a)
provide evidence that credit booms are driven by fluctuations in credit supply.
This idea is in line with Kindleberger (1978), who argues that “in moments of
euphoria" (p.57) banks will come up with new ways to lend and create liquidity,
thus increasing the supply of credit. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2017) pro-
vide a rationalization for how this might come about. In their model, the agent’s
savings decision is distorted by the representative heuristic which leads to ex-
trapolative expectations. This means that in good times, agents underestimate
the probability for lending firms to default.
Conversely, if households or firms demand more credit, we expect interest rates
to rise. In Mian et al. (2017b), this takes the form of a temporarily lower ef-
fective interest rate that households face. This, they argue, might be due to fi-
nancial deregulation or overoptimistic income expectations. The lower interest
rate induces households to take on debt to finance higher consumption. Gen-
naioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2016) find evidence that firm managers have extrap-
olative expectations. This could similarly lead them to be too optimistic when
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times are good. Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013) provide a model
in which noisy information about future productivity induce agents to consume
more than optimal. This, too, might be an explanation for periodical expansions
and contractions in household’s saving behavior.
The equilibrium outcome in each case with respect to credit is the same: It
rises due to mistakes in the expectation formation. In our empirical analysis,




Near the middle of every month, forecasters of 32 countries fill out a survey by
the private data provider Consensus Economics and predict real GDP growth for
the current and next year. The CEF dataset is highly fragmented and manually
processed as the data providers sends updates as PDF’s and Excel sheets to in-
stitutions and Central Banks. We go to great lengths to collect and aggregate all
available data to create one unified database of macroeconomic expectations.
Participating firms (or “panelists”) are a mix of banks, private and public re-
search institutes, market intelligence firms, industrial unions and business orga-
nizations. Figure 4.1 shows the panelists with the most forecasts (aggregated
to quarterly) which are JP Morgan (5340), UBS (4662) and Goldman Sachs
(4356). Forecasters or their subsidiaries reside in the country whose economy
they predict. Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2011) show that geography
proximity increases forecaster accuracy. As participating firms might differ in
their access to local information, in how they form forecasts and in the effort
they exert, the quality of forecasts might also not be the same across firms. How-
ever, with about 17 (st.d.: ±5) forecasters per month and country, the weight of
any individual forecasts is low.
Figure 4.2 shows how the number of panelists evolved. The number of panelists
was approximately constant for most countries. Over the years, more panelists
were surveyed in France and Germany and fewer for Great Britain, for which this
number fell from the highest ever in 1994 with 39 forecasts. The Netherlands
and Norway had the fewest forecasts with an average of 10 forecasts per month.
The approximately constant number of forecasts is a further sign of the quality
of the Consensus Economics data. This is in contrast to the US Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters, where this number fell between 1970 and 1990 (Capistrán
and Timmermann, 2009).






























1989-2017, quarterly for 32 countries
Note: The other 727 panelists provide another 31,155 forecasts 
(mean: 42.9, median: 25).
Figure 4.1. Forecasts by Panelist
Panelists in the dataset are not anonymous, so career and reputational concerns
might incentivize participating institutions to exert high effort to provide good
forecasts. This is in contrast to other surveys such as the Philadelphia Fed’s Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters or the European Central Bank’s Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters, where the names of participating firms are not public. How-
ever, not being anonymous might also keep panelists from making forecasts that
are more unusual for fear of being singled out for large forecast errors.
Some researchers, such as Dovern, Fritsche, and Slacalek (2012) and Rülke,
Silgoner, and Wörz (2016), have also worked with the CEF data to tackle differ-
ent questions, but we are the first to measure cycles of expectation errors and
their financial stability implications. We take the errors that participants make
in their forecasts as a sign for optimism and pessimism. Ideally we would like
to also know participants’ individual uncertainty surrounding their point fore-
casts to assess whether they were really overconfident in their predictions. An
advantage of obtaining the microdata of forecasts is our ability to track firms
over time and to provide a measure of forecaster dispersion for which we use the
standard deviation of point forecasts across panelists at any point in time. We
take this as a proxy for forecaster uncertainty, an approach that Bachmann et al.
(2013) find support for. The broad coverage of macroeconomic variables also
means that we can control for other relevant expectations, such as the expected
inflation rate.
Batchelor (2001) and Loungani (2001) analyze the performance of the CEF fore-
casts and show while they are better than OECD and the IMF forecasts, they are
not very good in absolute terms. Breitung and Knüppel (2017) recently provide
evidence that the CEF forecasts might not be informative beyond two to four
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quarters. For the argument in this paper we require that the predictions voiced
by professional forecasters are indicative of the opinions held by agents in the
economy. People cannot perfectly predict the course of economy and neither can
professional forecasters.
Several assumptions are needed for interpreting forecaster errors as expecta-
tions of agents in the economy. First, we assume that households hold similar
beliefs about the future as do professional forecasters. This might be the case if
households and professional forecasters have the same information to construct
forecasts. Or it could hold if professional forecasts are published in newspapers
and people align their expectations with what they read. A last reason for such
a connection between what households expect and what financial firms predict
is that both might be driven some third factor such as “optimism", sometimes
also called “sentiment" or “exuberance" (Shiller, 2000).
A second assumption becomes necessary when we think about a representative
household’s savings decision. Typically, households smooth consumption and
thus when deciding on how to divide their income into consumption and saving,
they not only take next year’s income into account, but the discounted sum
of all future incomes. So ideally, we would like to measure peoples’ lifetime
income expectations. However, expectations about GDP growth over the next 12
months are all that we can construct from the CEF data. Several facts mitigate
this concern: Households discount incomesmore, the further into the future they
accrue. Next, if GDP is a random walk, then the one-period (12 month) ahead
forecast is the same as the long-run forecast. Neither of these explanations is
likely to be exactly true, but both make using the 12 month expected real GDP
growth rate a plausible proxy for household’s lifetime income expectations.
4.3.2 Macroeconomic Data
For quarterly macroeconomic data we rely on a number of standard sources,
such as the OECD, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Balance, the
IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics, national statistical agencies and national
central banks.
Data on credit are provided by the BIS. The BIS defines “credit” as loans and
debt securities provided to the private non-financial sector which includes non-
financial firms, households and non-profit organizations serving households.
The lenders can be domestic banks, the rest of the economy and foreigners.
We separately use household debt including non-profit organizations serving
households (hhd) and non-financial firm debt (fd).
Table 4.1 summarizes the resulting dataset. It provides a good coverage of
global economies, as countries in the sample accounted for 79 percent of global
4.3 Data | 101
Turkey United States
South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Thailand
New Zealand Norway Poland Russia Singapore
Italy Japan Malaysia Mexico Netherlands
Great Britain Hong Kong Hungary India Indonesia
China Colombia Czech R. France Germany
Argentina Australia Brazil Canada Chile
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010













































Dec 1989-Dec 2016, monthly
Figure 4.2. Number of Panelists
purchasing power adjusted real GDP in 2015. With 18 out of the largest 20
economies, we cover most major economies. This global coverage also allows
us to trace the association between expectation formation and credit accumu-
lation in developing countries which make up about half the countries in the
sample. The data for most countries in the sample starts in the 1990s and runs
until 2016. For the exact starting dates when countries join our dataset, see
Tables 4.A.1 and 4.A.2.
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Table 4.1. Data Summary
Number countries 32
(of which developing countries)1 (47%)
Coverage starting in 1980s 6
Coverage starting in 1990s 18
Coverage starting in 2000s 8
Share world GDP, PPP (2015) 79%
Forecasts by country-month 17 (±5)
1: according to IMF
4.3.3 Forecasts and Realizations
Participating firms provide their forecasts for the annual values of the current
and following year. For example, forecasters in June 2016 would provide their
guesses for real GDP growth for the year 2016 and 2017. This poses a chal-
lenge for the interpretation of this data, as more information becomes avail-
able throughout the year. As an extreme case, a forecaster interviewed in mid-
December will know with considerable accuracy what happened in the current
year. This introduces a seasonality in the forecasts that hinders proper interpre-
tation of this data.
Instead, we would like to use forecasts for the growth rate of real GDP twelve
months from survey date. So the challenge is to convert fixed event to fixed hori-
zon forecasts. Two papers provide methods to overcome this problem, tailored
to the data structure of the CEF forecasts. Both use linear weightings of the fore-
casts for the current and the following year to construct the fixed horizon fore-
cast. The first — Dovern, Fritsche, and Slacalek (2012) — suggests putting pro-
gressively less weight on the current year forecast as the year advances. While
this holds intuitive appeal, there is no theoretical basis for using this method.
Knüppel and Vladu (2016) instead propose a different weighting which mini-
mizes the expected squared error loss and this method performs better at ap-
proximating the fixed horizon forecasts. A key insight from the Knüppel and
Vladu (2016) method is somewhat puzzling: For fixed horizon forecasts con-
structed for the first months in a year, they prescribe to put no weight on the
forecasts for the current year. The optimal weights for the current year forecasts
even become negative midyear and then positive at the end of the year. Overall,
the absolute weight for current year forecasts is very low.3
3The maximum absolute prescribed weight for the current year under our parameterization (ρ =
0) is 8 percent, so at a minimum 92 percent of the constructed forecast comes from next year’s
forecast. Figure 4.B.1 plots the weights for the two methods.
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The reason for this difference between the two approaches is that the hypothet-
ical synthetic forecaster in the ad hoc method by Dovern et al. (2012) puts sig-
nificant weight on the latest information they received. Acknowledging recent
changes is different from making a 12 month forecast, a time span in which re-
cent shocks might have subsided. Due to the better theoretical foundation and
the provided empirical evidence we choose the procedure by Knüppel and Vladu
(2016), but results remain unchanged when applying the method by Dovern et
al. (2012).
We only keep forecasts made in the last month in every quarter to be able to
compare them against subsequent real GDP growth realizations, which are only
available at quarterly frequency. Figure 4.3 shows forecasts and the subsequent
realizations of real GDP growth. The realizations are forward-looking, so the
value in the first quarter of 2000 indicates the growth rate of real GDP until the
end of the first quarter of 2001. So in the figure, at any point in time we see
the four standard error bands (two above and two below) around the consensus
forecasts and the ex post true realization. The vertical distance between the two
are the forecast errors.
Some of the series (e.g. Argentina) are much more volatile than others (e.g.
USA). It is striking how rarely the black line lies within the gray bands, so the
GDP growth realizations are more volatile than the forecasts. In particular, fore-
casts often lag behind the realizations, as if forecasters extrapolated recent re-
alizations. The large recession between 2007 and 2009 surprised forecasters in
most countries which led to large positive forecast errors.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Forecast Errors
Figure 4.4 plots the the forecast errors, calculated as the consensus (mean) fore-
casts minus realizations. There are periods of positive (red) and negative (blue)
forecast errors among all countries. Forecast errors are particularly high when
large recessions strike, a result in line with McNees (1992). Magnitudes are
much larger in some countries (Argentina, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Russia, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey) and this is mostly driven by much
higher macroeconomic volatility in developing countries.
To analyze the persistence in the forecast errors, Figure 4.5 shows the autocor-
relations of forecast errors. The errors are significantly positively autocorrelated
within one year (lag 1 to 4) for most countries. For some countries there is a sig-
104 | 4 Unexpectedly Broke
Turkey United States
South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Thailand
New Zealand Norway Poland Russia Singapore
Italy Japan Malaysia Mexico Netherlands
Great Britain Hong Kong Hungary India Indonesia
China Colombia Czech R. France Germany
Argentina Australia Brazil Canada Chile
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
















































































































































Figure 4.3. GDP Forecasts and Realizations
Note: Shaded areas show 2 standard deviation bands around mean forecasts. Black
lines are realizations. Both forecasts and growth rates are forward-looking for 12
months ahead.
nificant reversal towards a negative autocorrelation after about two years (lag
8).⁴
⁴As Kučinskas and Peters (2018) explain, the existence of autocorrelation in forecast errors alone
is a strong sign of a bias in expectation formation. We will explore this further in Section 4.5.2.
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Figure 4.4. Forecast Errors
Note: Positive values (red) show real GDP growth (4 quarters ahead) mean (consen-
sus) forecasts larger than realizations. Vice versa for negative values (blue).
These persistent errors raise the question of howwell the hypothetical consensus
(mean) forecaster for each country is calibrated.⁵ As reported in Table 4.A.1 and
4.A.2, errors are significantly positive at the 95% level for Canada, France, Italy,
Japan, Mexico and Thailand, so in these countries forecasters overestimated
output growth on average. China is a special case as well: Forecasters underes-
⁵Figure 4.B.2 in the Appendix shows kernel density plots of forecast errors for each of the country
in the sample.
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Figure 4.5. Autocorrelations of Forecast Errors
timated China’s real GDP growth in every quarter between the first quarter of
1999 and the first quarter of 2007.
Overall, these forecast errors point to extended periods when even professional
forecasters were strongly mistaken about aggregate income growth over the
coming year. In the following empirical analysis, we examine what else char-
acterized these periods of booms and busts in expectations.
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Table 4.2. Baseline Regressions
Dependent variable: hhdi,t (household debt growth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast errors 0.91∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.70∗∗
(0.36) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.33)
Real GDP gr. 1.22∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.34) (0.35)
Exp. ination 0.61∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25)






Observations 2348 2301 2301 2295 2295 2295
R2 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Note: All models include country and time xed eects. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. GDP: real GDP y-o-y growth. Exp. ination:
12-month ahead expected CPI growth. Exp. ination: 12-month ahead ex-
pected CPI growth. Uncertainty: Standard deviation of forecasts. Banking
crises are dened by Laeven and Valencia (2012).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
4.4.2 Comovement with Credit Cycles
We compare periods of positive or negative expectation errors with cyclical ex-
pansions and contractions in lending in the economy. Our proxy for the financial
cycle are household and firm debt growth. We graph these variables in Figures
4.B.3 and 4.B.4 and we can see distinct financial cycles across countries. Some
countries experience only one cyclical swing (in household debt growth) in the
sample period (Brazil, Czech Republic, Japan, Spain and Sweden), while for
others the measure is trending in this period (Indonesia and the Netherlands).
When banking crises hit, GDP in many countries contracts strongly, so we ob-
serve sharp drops in their credit growth rates. In the empirical analysis, we
carefully exclude the possibility that the association we find is driven by these
periods.
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Table 4.3. Regressions by Subperiods
Dependent variable: hhdi,t (household debt growth)
no crisis 2007-2009 -2006 2010-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forecast errors 1.12∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.64∗ 0.13 1.21∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.16 0.077
(0.45) (0.41) (0.35) (0.55) (0.41) (0.37) (0.26) (0.26)
Observations 1969 1916 379 379 1188 1144 781 772
R2 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.15 0.23 0.12 0.21
Add. controls 3 3 3 3
Note: All models include country and time xed eects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Additional controls are real GDP y-o-y growth, expected ination, inter-
est rates and forecaster dispersion (uncertainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We investigate the contemporaneous comovement between forecast errors and
credit growth using the following panel regression,
ci,t = γi + δt + β1 fi,t + X i,t β2 + "i,t , (4.1)
where ci,t are the credit variables, γi is a country fixed effect, δt is a time fixed
effect, β1 is the regression coefficient of interest, fi,t are forecast errors, X i,t
are controls and "i,t is the error term. Credit variables, ci,t , are known to be
autocorrelated (Drehmann et al., 2018) and we have shown the same for the
forecast errors fi,t (Figure 4.5). We therefore use robust standard errors. For
the covariates X i,t , we use real GDP growth (backward-looking, over last 12
months), expected inflation (also from the CEF), interest rates and forecast dis-
persion (standard deviation across panelists) and banking crises dummies by
Laeven and Valencia (2012).
Table 4.2 displays the baseline results. The first column shows the results for the
bivariate regression for which the estimated coefficient, βˆ1, is positive and sig-
nificant. This means that when professional forecasters were 1 percentage point
too optimistic ( fi t = 1), household debt growth was on average 0.91 percentage
points higher. This association stays significant when we control for the states
of the business cycle, in column (2), the expected ex ante real interest rate in
column (3) and (4) and proxies for uncertainty in (5) and dummy variables for
banking crises in model version (6).⁶
This establishes the main result: Periods of ex-post excessively optimistic GDP
growth expectations also saw expansions in cyclical lending in the economy. In
⁶Adding quarterly dummies does not affect results.
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Table 4.4. Regression by Country Groups
Dependent variable: hhdi,t (household debt growth)
Industrialized Developing -China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Forecast errors 0.49∗∗ 0.24 0.58∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗ 1.26∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.71∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.49) (0.47) (0.64) (0.36) (0.35) (0.37)
Observations 1588 1567 901 760 728 243 2316 2263 1144
R2 0.28 0.37 0.21 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.17 0.26 0.23
Countries 18 18 18 14 14 14 31 31 31
Add. controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
< 2007 3 3 3
Note: All models include country and time xed eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
A minus indicates excluding countries. Additional controls are real GDP y-o-y growth, expected
ination, interest rates and forecaster dispersion (uncertainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
the rest of this section, we explore the heterogeneity in our results by providing
separate estimates for different time periods and country subgroups.
We first check whether the observed pattern might be driven by the global finan-
cial crisis of 2007-2009. This episode is not classified as a banking crises for all
countries, but many countries experienced a strong recession nonetheless. Dur-
ing the crisis, real GDP dropped precipitously for most countries, but forecasters
were slow to adapt their expectations (see Figure 4.3). The resulting forecast
error is therefore strongly positive, suggesting along our line of argument that
during the financial crisis people were far too optimistic about the path of their
future incomes. In fact, we find the opposite (see Table 4.3); results hold even
when we exclude the financial crisis (column (1)-(2)). They are also robust to
estimating the model on the data only before the crisis (columns (5)-(6)), but
not on data after the crisis (columns (7)-(8)). During the financial crisis that
took place between 2007 to 2009 (columns (3)-(4)) the coefficient becomes
insignificant which might be due to the lower number of observations.
In Table 4.4, we report results for country groups. The results for industrialized
and developing countries point in the same directions. The greater macroeco-
nomic volatility of developing countries might explain the larger estimates for
these countries. When adding additional macroeconomic controls, the results
are more pronounced for developing countries. The full model with all covari-
ates is insignificant for the whole sample for industrialized countries, but the as-
sociation holds before 2007. This is the most relevant period, as it coincides with
the build-up of financial imbalances before the financial crisis of 2008. China is a
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special case as forecasters strongly underestimated its growth performance over
several consecutive years. Our results become even stronger when we exclude
it in columns (7)-(9).
Strikingly, the relationship between firm debt and forecast errors is mostly in-
signficant (Tables 4.A.3, 4.A.4 and 4.A.5). We therefore find that expectation
errors about aggregate income are contemporaneously related to the growth
rates of household debt, but not to non-financial firm debt. This might be a sign
that is the expectations by households (or by banks about households), not ex-
pectations by firms (or by banks about firms) that are occasionally misaligned.
4.4.3 Robustness Checks
As explained before, there are different ways of converting fixed event to fixed
horizon forecasts. Results are unchanged when we use the alternative Dovern








Significant at 5% level? insignificant negative positive
Figure 4.6. Robustness to Alternative Overoptimism Denitions
Note: Squares indicate the sign and signicance of βˆ . The baseline is a bivariate of house-
hold debt growth on the variable of interest, controlling for time and country xed eects
and using robust standard errors. Columns are estimates using the alternative overopti-
mism denitions 1, 2, ..., 11. Left panels show results for the sample up to 2006 and right
panes for after 2010. Top panels show results for industrialized countries and bottom
panes those for developing countries.
Our prefered way of measuring overoptimism is to use forecast errors. Onemight
also define these proxies differently, by taking into account the sign and persis-
tence of errors and comparing them to trend output growth rates. We define
eleven alternative ways (see Appendix Section 4.C) to define overoptimism and
provide a concise summary of how results change in Figure 4.6. This plot shows
the signs and significance of the βˆ coefficient in Equation 4.1. We show results
for the basline bivariate regression without covariates, but including time and
country fixed effects and using robust standard errors. Secondly, we also con-
trol for the state of the business cycle by including current real GDP growth. We











Within 95% confidence interval?            outside     inside
Forecasts about euro area real GDP growth, Sep 1999 - Jun 2017
Figure 4.7. Overcondence in the ECB SPF
Note: Shows whether subsequent realizations of 12 month ahead real euro area
GDP growth was within the 95 percent prediction interval of individual forecasters.
Columns show the predictions by individual forecasting rms with numbers from
001 to 115. Empty squares show missing data. Source: ECB Survey of Professional
Forecasters
split samples into before 2006 and 2010 and into industrialized and developing
country groups.
What becomes apparent is that the estimates are either positively significant or
insignificant across most specifications. Especially before 2006, many of the al-
ternative overoptimism definitions also return positive estimates for the comove-
ment with household debt growth. This mirrors our baseline findings which
were also only significant for the period before 2006. For developing countries,
several of the alternative indicators still return positive estimates after 2010.
This is also similar to the findings from Table 4.4.
4.5 Explaining Forecast Errors
4.5.1 Uncertainty of Individual Forecasters
In this paper, we analyze the predictions by professional forecasters. However,
every firm only submits point forecasts and they do not report how certain they
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are about their predictions. We interpret differences between forecasts and sub-
sequent realizations as forecast errors. But how can we do this if we do not know
how uncertain forecasters were individually? They might have had very wide
distributions of outcomes in mind, but were forced to submit point forecasts.
Our data does not permit us to analyze this further. So we turn to a dataset
that does allow us to do so, the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) by the
European Central Bank.⁷ In this survey, participants report a point forecast and
subjective probabilities they assign to different bins. This allows us to calculate
the width of individual forecasters’ confidence bands. Figure 4.B.5 shows the
mean of this value across forecasters.
On average, forecasters stated that they were 95 percent certain that one-year-
ahead real GDP growth would lie in an interval with a width between 1.1 and
2.6 percentage points. However, Figure 4.7 shows that forecasters were far off
with their forecasts. Only 34 percent of realizations lie within the 95 percent
confidence bands. This immediately tells us that panelists were overconfident
in their forecasts. This is puzzling as firms have no incentive tomake such narrow
predictions. Forecasters are not identified by name in the SPF and there is no
scoring of predictive accuracy that might reward more aggressive predictions.
Figure 4.B.5 displays an upward trend in the width of confidence bands, so
participants have become more cautious with their predictions.
Overall, we take thees findings as a sign that panelists in the survey are indeed
too confident about their forecasts. While we cannot with certainty extrapolate
the findings from the ECB SPF to the CEF, the vast amount of overconfidence
in the former strongly suggests that a related mechanism might explain the
pronounced and persistent forecast errors that we find for many more countries
in the CEF.
4.5.2 Forecast Revisions and Information Processing
We have documented that positive forecast errors are associated with debt
growth in the economy and that positive forecast errors are likely to be a proxy
for overoptimism of forecasters. But this begs the question why forecasters be-
come overoptimistic in the first place. An active literature uses forecast revisions
to analyze how panelists change their forecast when they receive new informa-
tion. We use the methodology developed by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012)
and Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2018) to test how forecasters in our
sample react to new information and discuss how this effect varies over the
credit cycle.
⁷A limitation is that this survey only makes forecasts for the euro area. So what we gain in detail,
we loose in generalizability.
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On the level of individual forecasters, we regress forecast errors on the change
in the forecast over the last month:
fi,k,t = β revi,k,t + ui,k,t . (4.2)
Here, fi,k,t is the forecast error for country i, forecaster k in year t, revi,k,t are
forecast revisions and ui,k,t is the residual.
Every panelist in the CEF makes two forecasts at the same time, one for the
current year and one for the next. We previously aggregated those two fixed
horizon forecasts to one fixed event forecasts, but that is not necessary now.
Instead, we report separate estimates for the coefficient βˆ for both forecasts the
panelists make.
We also add some indicator variables for the month the forecasts were made in,
to control for seasonal trends in information updating. Such patterns are likely,
as new information is revealed at fixed points during the year, for example when
new GDP forecasts are made public. Also, forecasts mechanically get better as
the year progresses. Using microdata on the level of individual panelists shows
the strength of the highly detailed dataset we use in this paper. It enables us to
also control for the panelist which eliminates panelist idiosyncracies.
As explained by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Bordalo et al. (2018),
the coefficient βˆ shows how forecasters react to new infomation. If panelists up-
dated their forecasts rationally, we would not expect a significant relationship
with the forecast error fi,k,t . But say they received positive news and updated
their forecasts upwards. If they overshot and reacted too strongly to new in-
formation, the resulting forecast error would be negative. This means that a
negative βˆ coefficient is symptomatic of overreaction. If they instead did not ad-
just their forecast upwards enough, forecast errors would be positive – a sign of
underreaction.
Thismethod has previously been used to differentiate between classes ofmacroe-
conomic models. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) found evidence for under-
reaction, but Bordalo et al. (2018) argue that this is due to their use of consensus
(mean) forecasts. They show that – at least for the United States – overreaction
dominates.
Our results are shown in Figure 4.8 for each country, split for forecasts for the
current and next year and using consensus and individual data. The figure shows
the OLS coefficient and 95 percent confidence bands. There is strong evidence
for overreaction. This holds for most countries in the sample using consensus or
individual data. The results are more pronounced for the forecasts for the next
year than for the current year. This is to be expected, as panelists have much
more information on the current year and forecasts errors are much smaller
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Figure 4.8. Information Processing
Note: Uses one-month forecast revisions for consensus (mean) and for individual forecasts
on 1991-2016 monthly forecasts about annual real GDP growth. Shows separate estimates by
country of regressing forecast errors on forecast revisions controlling for forecast month. Also
controls for the panelists in the case of panelist-level data.
(and plausibly also better calibrated) as a result. In contrast to Bordalo et al.
(2018) we also find stronger evidence for overreaction when using aggregate
data as opposed to using microdata.
However, this association is strongly driven by the inclusion of the financial cri-
sis period 2007 to 2009 during which period there was pronounced overreac-
tion across countries. We also investigate how information processing changes
through the credit cycle. For this, we run the same analysis as before, but pool
the data from several countries to get a dense dataset that allows us to display
highly detailed results. For this, we run a panel data analysis including country
































Figure 4.9. Information Processing over the Credit Cycle
Note: Uses one-month forecast revisions for consensus (mean) forecasts on 1991-2016
monthly forecasts about annual real GDP growth. Uses next year forecasts. Shows panel esti-
mates including country xed eects (but no time xed eects), controlling for forecastmonth.
Sample is split into ve bins depending on country-specic household debt growth quintiles.
fixed effects. In addition, we partition the dataset depending on a country’s po-
sition in its quintile of household debt growth. Figure 4.9 shows these results,
separated by the periods before, during and after the financial crisis and split
into industrialized and developing country groups.
Across specifications, we find that overreaction and insignificant results outnum-
ber underreaction. Especially up to 2006 there is very robust evidence of over-
reaction throughout the household debt growth distribution. As mentioned be-
fore, the period from 2007 to 2009 was a period of strong overreaction. Most
estimates are insignificant from 2010 onwards. This finding helps explain why
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forecasters - and other agents in the economy - might have become overopti-
mistic: During boom times of the Great Moderation before the financial crisis
people received positive news and their expectations adjust upwards and over-
shot. If households form their expectations similarly to professional forecasters,
they may have underestimated future risks and therefore took on too much debt
in the run-up to the financial crisis.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to inform the discussion on the buildup of imbalances in the
international financial system. We identify periods of positive and negative mis-
takes in output growth expectations of professional forecasters and show that
these periods are characterized by strong credit growth. While household debt
rises in such periods of excessive income expectations, firm debt does not re-
spond. These findings are in line with theories in which biased income-savings
decisions drive unsustainable debt booms, with harmful consequences for the
economy.
We provide more detailed findings that reveal the psychological mechanisms for
the formation of expectation errors. First, panelists (at least in the case of the
euro area, where we can be sure) display strong signs of overprecision, so they
are too confident about their predictions. Second, panelists overshoot when they
receive new information. This second insight emerges from an analysis of fore-
cast revisions using established methods from the literature. This overreaction
of forecasts was particularly strong before 2006, when leverage in the financial
system was growing.
A limitation of this study is the late start of the time series dimension with our
first observations starting in 1989. This means that we miss important swings of
the national and global financial cycle and are limited to the end of the “finan-
cial hockey stick" (Jordà et al., 2016). On the upside, the dataset used in this
study has a broad international coverage of 32 countries, allowing us to control
for circumstances that might be specific to individual countries and making it
possible to report results separately for industrialized and developing countries.
The results reported here hold for both subgroups, which is particularly striking
considering the differences in macroeconomic volatilities and financial systems
of these groups of countries. Access to the microdata of forecasts also allows
us to control for the dispersion across predictions which serves as a proxy for
uncertainty and to use forecaster fixed effects for some of our analyses.
A downside of our method is that surveys of professional forecasts might only
be correlated weakly with expectations of households or firms. A better way
forward would be to collect such expectations across groups of agents and for
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many countries. Rozsypal and Schlafmann (2017), using consumer surveys, are
able to measure expectations across household income distribution. Expanding
such an approach across countries is a promising direction for future research.
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Appendix 4.A Additional Tables
Table 4.A.1. Country Data Sources and Summary Statistics
Country Dev. Source First Last Obs. Nr. forec. CI forec.
1 Argentina 3 indec 1995 Q2 2015 Q4 71 20 (±5) [-1.3, 1.9]
2 Australia oecd 1991 Q1 2016 Q4 104 17 (±2) [-0.2, 0.2]
3 Brazil 3 oecd 1996 Q2 2016 Q1 73 18 (±3) [0.0, 1.3]
4 Canada oecd 1989 Q4 2016 Q4 109 16 (±2) [0.1, 0.7]
5 Chile 3 oecd 2003 Q4 2016 Q4 53 18 (±2) [0.0, 1.3]
6 China 3 Atlanta Fed1 2007 Q1 2014 Q4 32 18 (±3) [-0.6, 0.3]
7 Colombia 3 oecd 2000 Q2 2016 Q4 65 13 (±2) [-0.8, 0.2]
8 Czech R. oecd 1998 Q3 2016 Q4 57 18 (±2) [-0.4, 1.2]
9 France oecd 1989 Q4 2016 Q4 109 19 (±3) [0.1, 0.8]
10 Germany oecd, destatis 1989 Q4 2016 Q4 109 28 (±2) [-0.2, 0.7]
11 Great Britain oecd 1989 Q4 2016 Q4 109 28 (±5) [-0.3, 0.4]
12 Hong Kong C&SD2 1994 Q4 2016 Q1 86 16 (±2) [-0.5, 1.4]
13 Hungary 3 oecd 1998 Q3 2016 Q4 57 17 (±3) [-0.2, 1.4]
14 India 3 oecd 2008 Q2 2016 Q4 35 16 (±2) [-1.0, 0.8]
15 Indonesia 3 fred, aric3 2002 Q4 2015 Q3 52 14 (±2) [-0.4, 0.2]
16 Italy oecd 1996 Q1 2016 Q4 84 15 (±2) [0.4, 1.3]
17 Japan oecd 1989 Q1 2016 Q4 109 20 (±2) [0.2, 1.0]
18 Malaysia 3 aric3 2007 Q1 2015 Q3 35 15 (±2) [-0.8, 1.5]
19 Mexico 3 fred 1995 Q4 2016 Q1 71 19 (±3) [ 0.2, 1.4]
20 Netherlands oecd 1995 Q1 2016 Q4 88 10 (±2) [-0.5, 0.3]
21 New Zealand oecd 1994 Q4 2016 Q4 89 14 (±1) [-0.6, 0.2]
22 Norway oecd 1998 Q2 2016 Q4 75 10 (±2) [0.0, 0.9]
23 Poland 3 oecd 2002 Q1 2016 Q4 50 19 (±3) [-0.6, 0.4]
24 Russia 3 oecd, fred 1999 Q1 2016 Q4 56 17 (±3) [-0.7, 1.8]
25 Singapore singstat4 1994 Q4 2016 Q1 86 15 (±2) [-1.6, 0.7]
26 South Korea oecd 1994 Q4 2016 Q4 89 16 (±2) [-0.6, 1.1]
27 Spain oecd 1995 Q1 2016 Q4 88 15 (±2) [-0.4, 0.3]
28 Sweden oecd 2000 Q4 2016 Q4 88 14 (±2) [-0.5, 0.3]
29 Switzerland oecd 2000 Q4 2016 Q4 65 14 (±2) [-0.5, 0.3]
Continued.
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Table 4.A.2. Country Data Sources and Summary Statistics
Country Dev. Source First Last Obs. Nr. forec. CI forec.
30 Thailand 3 BoT5 1994 Q4 2015 Q3 84 14 (±3) [0.3, 2.3]
31 Turkey 3 oecd 1998 Q3 2016 Q4 57 15 (±3) [-2.3, 0.5]
32 USA oecd 1989 Q4 2016 Q4 109 27 (±3) [-0.1, 0.5]
Note: Developing country classications (“Dev.”) are according to IMF “World Eco-
nomic Outlook Report" (2017). “Obs." are the number of quarterly observations
with complete data for a respective country. “Nr. forec” are the means of the num-
ber of forecasts used to calculate an aggregated mean quarterly forecast with stan-
dard errors in parentheses. “CI forec.” are the 95% condence intervals of the fore-
cast errors of 4-quarters ahead real GDP growth (boldface shows signicance).
1: Higgins and Zha (2015), Atlanta Fed; 2: Census and Statistics Department
3: Asia Regional Integration Center; 4: Statistics Singapore; 5: Bank of Thailand
Table 4.A.3. Baseline Regressions (Firm Debt)
Dependent variable: fdi,t (rm debt growth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast errors 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.23
(0.33) (0.29) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Real GDP gr. -0.13 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.13
(0.43) (0.36) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34)
Exp. ination 1.48∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)






Observations 2330 2283 2283 2277 2277 2277
R2 0.13 0.14 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Note: All models include country and time xed eects. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. GDP: real GDP y-o-y growth. Exp. ina-
tion: 12-month ahead expected CPI growth. Exp. ination: 12-month
ahead expected CPI growth. Uncertainty: Standard deviation of fore-
casts. Banking crises are dened by Laeven and Valencia (2012).***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A.4. Regressions by Subperiods (Firm Debt)
Dependent variable: fdi,t (rm debt growth)
no crisis 2007-2009 -2006 2010-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forecast errors 0.085 0.19 0.32 0.090 -0.016 0.23 0.46∗∗ 0.46∗
(0.42) (0.15) (0.29) (0.43) (0.55) (0.20) (0.22) (0.24)
Observations 1951 1898 379 379 1170 1126 781 772
R2 0.095 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.090 0.34 0.19 0.21
Add. controls 3 3 3 3
Note: All models include country and time xed eects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Additional controls are real GDP y-o-y growth, expected ination,
interest rates and forecaster dispersion (uncertainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.A.5. Regression by Country Groups (Firm Debt)
Dependent variable: fdi,t (rm debt growth)
Industrialized Developing -China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Forecast errors 0.41∗∗ 0.11 0.17 -0.096 0.25 0.099 0.094 0.18 0.23
(0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.51) (0.30) (0.64) (0.34) (0.14) (0.20)
Observations 1570 1549 883 760 728 243 2298 2245 1126
R2 0.26 0.38 0.35 0.26 0.42 0.53 0.14 0.31 0.34
Countries 18 18 18 14 14 14 31 31 31
Add. controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
< 2007 3 3 3
Note: All models include country and time xed eects. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Aminus indicates excluding countries. Additional controls are real GDP y-o-y growth, ex-
pected ination, interest rates and forecaster dispersion (uncertainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 4.A.6. Baseline Regressions (Alternative Weighting)
Dependent variable: hhdi,t (household debt growth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast errors 1.05∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.70∗∗
(0.34) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34)
Real GDP gr. 1.11∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.30) (0.31)
Exp. ination 0.63∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25)






Observations 2348 2301 2301 2295 2295 2295
R2 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Note: Uses alternative Dovern et al. (2012) weighting. All models include
country and time xed eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. GDP:
real GDP y-o-y growth. Exp. ination: 12-month ahead expected CPI growth.
Exp. ination: 12-month ahead expected CPI growth. Uncertainty: Standard
deviation of forecasts. Banking crises are dened by Laeven and Valencia
(2012).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.A.7. Regressions by Subperiods (Alternative Weighting)
Dependent variable: hhdi,t (household debt growth)
no crisis 2007-2009 -2006 2010-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forecast errors 1.27∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 0.56∗ -0.022 1.34∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.29 0.098
(0.42) (0.40) (0.30) (0.46) (0.40) (0.32) (0.20) (0.25)
Observations 1969 1916 379 379 1188 1144 781 772
R2 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.21
Add. controls 3 3 3 3
Note: Uses alternative Dovern et al. (2012) weighting. All models include country and
time xed eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls are real
GDP y-o-y growth, expected ination, interest rates and forecaster dispersion (uncer-
tainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A.8. Regression by Country Groups (Alternative Weighting)
Dependent variable: hhdi,t (household debt growth)
Industrialized Developing -China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Forecast errors 0.52∗∗∗ 0.24 0.57∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗ 1.45∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.72∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.45) (0.49) (0.53) (0.35) (0.36) (0.32)
Observations 1588 1567 901 760 728 243 2316 2263 1144
R2 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.19 0.27 0.23
Countries 18 18 18 14 14 14 31 31 31
Add. controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
< 2007 3 3 3
Note: Uses alternative Dovern et al. (2012) weighting. All models include country and time xed
eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. A minus indicates excluding countries. Additional
controls are real GDP y-o-y growth, expected ination, interest rates and forecaster dispersion (un-
certainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A.9. Baseline Regressions (Firm Debt, Alternative Weighting)
Dependent variable: fdi,t (rm debt growth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast errors -0.029 0.051 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12
(0.44) (0.37) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Real GDP gr. -0.12 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.14
(0.37) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31)
Exp. ination 1.49∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)






Observations 2330 2283 2283 2277 2277 2277
R2 0.13 0.14 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Note: Uses alternative Dovern et al. (2012) weighting. All models in-
clude country and time xed eects. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. GDP: real GDP y-o-y growth. Exp. ination: 12-month ahead ex-
pected CPI growth. Exp. ination: 12-month ahead expected CPI growth.
Uncertainty: Standard deviation of forecasts. Banking crises are de-
ned by Laeven and Valencia (2012).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.A.10. Regressions by Subperiods (Firm Debt, Alternative Weighting)
Dependent variable: fdi,t (rm debt growth)
no crisis 2007-2009 -2006 2010-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forecast errors -0.14 0.036 0.34 0.15 -0.35 0.030 0.48∗∗ 0.47∗
(0.54) (0.21) (0.27) (0.42) (0.74) (0.28) (0.22) (0.23)
Observations 1951 1898 379 379 1170 1126 781 772
R2 0.096 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.098 0.34 0.19 0.21
Add. controls 3 3 3 3
Note: Uses alternative Dovern et al. (2012) weighting. All models include country
and time xed eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls
are real GDP y-o-y growth, expected ination, interest rates and forecaster disper-
sion (uncertainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A.11. Regression by Country Groups (Firm Debt, Alternative Weighting)
Dependent variable: fdi,t (rm debt growth)
Industrialized Developing -China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Forecast errors 0.43∗∗ 0.094 0.12 -0.40 0.062 -0.31 -0.062 0.071 0.030
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.66) (0.36) (0.75) (0.44) (0.19) (0.28)
Observations 1570 1549 883 760 728 243 2298 2245 1126
R2 0.26 0.38 0.36 0.26 0.42 0.53 0.14 0.31 0.34
Countries 18 18 18 14 14 14 31 31 31
Add. controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
< 2007 3 3 3
Note: Uses alternative Dovern et al. (2012) weighting. All models include country and time
xed eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. A minus indicates excluding countries.
Additional controls are real GDP y-o-y growth, expected ination, interest rates and fore-
caster dispersion (uncertainty). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix 4.B Additional Figures
Dovern et al. (2012)



















Figure 4.B.1.Weights to Convert Fixed Event to Fixed Horizon Forecasts
Note: The weight put on the forecast for the sub-
sequent year is one minus the weight for the cur-
rent year. The Knüppel and Vladu (2016) values
are shown for ρ = 0.
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Figure 4.B.2. Distribution of Forecast Errors
Note: Kernel density plots of the distribution of forecast errors across countries.
Positive values show real GDP growth (4 quarters ahead)mean (consensus) forecasts
larger than realizations.
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Figure 4.B.3. Household Debt Growth
Note:Backward-looking y-o-y growth rates in credit to households and non-prot or-
ganizations serving households. Bars indicate banking crises as classied by Laeven
and Valencia (2012). Source: BIS and own calculations.
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Figure 4.B.4. Firm Debt Growth
Note: Backward-looking y-o-y growth rates in credit to non-nancial (private and
public) rms. Bars indicate banking crises as classied by Laeven and Valencia
(2012). Source: BIS and own calculations.

















Sep 1999 - Jun 2017
Figure 4.B.5. Individual Uncertainty
Source: ECB SPF
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Appendix 4.C Alternative Overoptimism Denitions
We analyze how our results change with different definitions for overoptimism. For this,
we also define overoptimism as follows:
1. Forecast errors as raw values. (Continous variable)
2. Dummies for periods with positive forecast errors. (Categorical variable)
3. Uses only positive forecast errors scaled by magnitude of forecast error. Assigns
missing values if forecast error is negative. (Continous variable)
4. Same as 3., but assigns zero if forecast error is negative. (Continous variable)
5. Dummies if both realizations and forecast errors are positive. (Categorical vari-
able)
6. Same as 5., but uses absolute magnitude of forecast error in those periods. As-
signs zero instead. (Continous variable)
7. Uses forecast errors in periods where forecast errors are positive for at least three
continuous periods. Assigns missing values if condition is not met. (Continous
variable)
8. Same as 7., but assigns zeros if condition is not met. (Continous variable)
9. Realizations and forecast errors are positive for at least three continuous periods.
(Categorical variable)
10. Dummy periods where forecast errors are positive and consensus forecasts are
above the long-run real GDP trend. (Categorical variable)
11. Scales forecasts by the share of individual forecasts per year that are above the
long-run real GDP growth trend. (Continous variable)
The long-run growth trends in versions 10. and 11. are taken from the Penn World
Tables 9.0 and are estimated as ten-year moving averages, interpolated to quarterly
frequencies.
